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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
General Acronyms 
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States (Negotiating group under the UN) 
CCCDP Convention for Climate Change Displaced Persons (Hodgkinson, 
Burton, Anderson and Young) 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UNFCCC’s scientific arm, 
which brings together scientists and science on climate change from 
all over the world)  
SIDS Small Island Developing States  
SIS Small Island States 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Convention establishing responses to anthropogenic climate change. 
Successor document currently under negotiation by 195 states.) 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
  
Convention for Climate Change Displaced Persons Acronyms 
CCDO Climate Change Displacement Organisation (central body of the 
Convention, comprised of four separate bodies) 
- Assembly Council 
- Climate Change Displacement Fund 
- Climate Change Displacement Environment and Science 
Organisation 
- Climate Change Displacement Implementation Groups 
CCDF Climate Change Displacement Fund 
CCDESO Climate Change Displacement Environment and Science Organisation 
CCDIGs Climate Change Displacement Implementation Groups 
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Introduction 
 
 
Climate change may be a relatively new phenomenon, but its effects are being felt 
throughout the world and having a significant impact on peoples’ lives in many 
countries.   Some of those most keenly feeling the effects live in areas that are 
particularly vulnerable to destabilizing factors acting in conjunction with existing 
challenges.  The effects of climate change are an exacerbating factor in sometimes 
already difficult lives.   
 
In some areas, the effects of climate change are or may become such that the 
inhabitants contemplate migration to find a more viable life elsewhere, either in 
their own country or in another country.  It is by no means guaranteed that the 
effects of climate change will inexorably lead people, such as those in low-lying small 
island states, to migrate outside their country, particularly if there are adequate 
measures taken to mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change.  
 
However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the potential for climate change-
related migration is drawing near, if it has not already arrived, as a factor for some 
people’s decisions to migrate internally or externally.  Some work currently 
underway considers approaches to dealing with climate change-related migration 
and the possible related issues around human rights protections and practical 
management.  Climate change is an amorphous, complex and politically challenging 
issue for governments and stakeholders to deal with.  Its effects on peoples’ lives 
can be significant, especially in conjunction with existing development, 
environmental, and economic challenges.  It is important to ensure that any 
approach created is necessary, in light of existing mechanisms and available 
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resources, and that it does not disadvantage any other groups of people through its 
creation or functioning.     
 
This thesis considers the state of the international approach to the potential 
problem of climate change-related migration.  One recently developed approach was 
a proposed Climate Change Displaced Persons Convention, which has been 
formulated by Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young (2010).   
 
A range of information was considered to try and find a balance between the 
attempt to deal with climate change as a public and foreign policy issue and the 
human reactions and subsequent choices people make in dealing with the effects of 
climate change.  Due to the complications of holding a position as a public servant 
working in the field of responses to climate change, I decided to use a methodology 
that would enable me to remain a step removed from the process, to avoid 
influencing responses. 
 
The thesis reviews current literature and experiences on climate change and 
migration, particularly in the Pacific, identifies key issues, and assesses the potential 
effectiveness of the Convention in addressing the issues identified.  Information 
sources included drawing on reports of first hand experience of climate change 
related migration and those living in the front line on the islands, experiences of 
working in the public and NGO sectors, and academic considerations of how to 
address climate change and migration. 
 
This area of climate change and potential migration which is developing and 
nebulous, and the potential value of the Convention is broader than one area picked 
up by traditional lenses.  Traditional political science or international relations 
political structures were not used to frame the thesis as no one lens could helpfully 
set a broad enough base for consideration.   For example, using governance theory 
would have started from the presumption that there is a tangible, discernible and 
existing process underway which needs only a structure to govern it.  As this thesis 
argues, migration resulting from climate change is not inevitable, therefore to use 
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governance theory would ignore considerations of approaches including actions that 
would render migration unnecessary, which is the logical and identified best 
outcome for those facing severe impacts of climate change.  Traditional approaches 
are not considered suitable for this analysis.  
 
The first section of the thesis, Section A, explains the scientific relationship between 
the process of climate change and human activity. Recognising the link between 
climate and a sustainable, viable life in particularly affected areas, the potential 
direct link between climate change and a need for human migration is identified.  
Having established the link the thesis discusses the normative weight and relative 
value of referential terms used in the context of potential migration and identifies an 
optimal definition for the potential problem: climate change related migration. 
 
Section B critically examines existing migration theory and current understandings of 
and approaches to migration, acknowledging that migration is complex and part of 
patterns of human behavior responding to environmental and other factors 
influencing a sustainable life.  It acknowledges that climate change related migration 
potentially occurs under situations for which traditional migration theory does not 
account for.  Recognising the danger of assuming that migration is the only possible 
response to the impacts of climate change, the spectrum of responses to climate 
change is identified, placing migration within the spectrum rather than as the 
inevitable end point or sole option for dealing with the effects of climate change. 
 
The third section, Section C, identifies gaps in existing initiatives and approaches to 
addressing climate change related migration. The gaps are: assumption of a human 
rights basis or facet to the potential problem; placing potential climate change 
related migration in consciousness as a preventable and early intervention issue; the 
complexity and sensitivity of migration as a human and political process in and of 
itself; competition between climate change related migration and other pressing 
social or international crises; and the difficulty of raising a policy response or even 
attempt to create a policy response in short term domestic political timeframes. 
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The final section specifically examines the Convention for its treatment of the 
assumptions identified in previous sections.  The Convention proposed by 
Hodgkinson, Anderson, Burton and Young is described and discussed, explaining its 
structure and technical approach.  The proposed Convention is assessed as a 
possible contribution to filling the identified gaps and addressing some of the 
inherent challenges associated with addressing potential climate change related 
migration.  Drawing on the assumptions identified in previous sections and the 
effects those assumptions have on understandings of and development of 
approaches to dealing with climate change related migration, the final section 
examines how usefully the proposed Convention deals with assumptions in creating 
potential climate change related migration.  Finally, the thesis examines the 
Convention’s effectiveness at taking an objective and principled approach to the 
issue of climate change related migration with a view to contributing to international 
policy.  
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Section A 
 
Climate change and its potential 
implications for migration 
 
This section describes that climate change has a number of impacts on the 
environment, which could degrade the environment to the point where people 
cannot maintain a sustainable life.  It is very difficult to define what a climate change 
related migrant would look like and to differentiate migration caused by the effects 
of climate change from other types of migration.  The problem under consideration 
is that the direct or indirect effects of climate change may impact people’s lives to 
the extent that they are forced to consider moving within or outside their country to 
achieve a sustainable life.   The importance of identifying human causes and factors 
in climate change lies in considering approaches to addressing its effects.  It is crucial 
that a definition of the problem accurately reflects the complex decision making 
process for those affected and considering whether to migrate.  Therefore the 
definition ‘climate change-related migration’ is used to avoid, as far as possible, 
creating misconceptions about the relationship between influencing factors and the 
decision to move. 
 
Climate change, its effects, and people movement 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its most recent Working 
Group Report states that “…warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now 
evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean 
temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea 
level” (Canziani et al, 2007, p.5).  Climate change as a concept continues to draw 
much discussion about its veracity and origins, despite the fact that (as Burson points 
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out) “…scientific consensus is crystallising around a realisation that climate change, 
more specifically, anthropogenic climate change, is real and constitutes a near-term 
threat” (Burson, 2010, p.9).  The complexity of the issue and the detail of scientific 
evidence and modelling make climate change a challenging field to work with in a 
public and foreign policy sense. Understanding the scientific basis is important for 
understanding the links between everyday activities, climate change and human 
movement.   
 
Climate is different from daily weather, which we all have a personal grasp of, in that 
‘climate’ constitutes the distribution of weather patterns over a long period of time, 
decades or more.  In this sense, climate can be understood as long-term average 
weather.  The earth’s climate has always been subject to natural cycles, oscillating 
between ice ages and warm periods (such as the temperate climate we are currently 
experiencing).  In the decades since the Industrial Revolution, scientists have 
discovered a number of changes in observed phenomena which are cause for 
concern.  These are warming oceans, significant ice loss from glaciers and polar ice 
caps, increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon 
dioxide (CO2), and a change in the directional warming pattern across hemispheres 
(Canziani et al, 2007; Morgan, 2009; Reisinger, 2009).   
 
All of these things can and do happen naturally, as part of the usual flux within and 
between warming and cooling cycles.  However, the changes and the speed of 
change observed since the beginning of the twentieth century have been atypical of 
normal patterns.  They have reached beyond even the predictions of scientific 
models and in some cases historic record, even when the widest plausible range of 
expected natural variation is taken into account.  Oceans are warming at both 
surface level (where changes of weather and short-term climate effects, such as La 
Niña, are often reflected) and deep ocean level, where the earth’s long-term heat 
energy is stored.  Ice loss is occurring at unusual levels and acceleration, and the 
pattern of global warming (comprised of land, sea and air temperature increases) 
has reversed so the Northern hemisphere is warming before the Southern (Canziani 
et al, 2007; Morgan, 2009; Reisinger, 2009).   
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Fossil fuel combustion accounts for more than 75% of the increase in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide, with most of the remainder of the increase in greenhouse gases 
coming from changes to land-use such as deforestation and altered agricultural 
processes (Canziani et al, 2007). Fossil fuel burning and changing agricultural 
practices (e.g. from forest to pasture) release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, 
thereby altering the balance of carbons (Canziani et al, 2007; Morgan, 2009; 
Reisinger, 2009).  “It’s like adding clear water to a bathful of dyed water, and even 
though some proportion of the dyed water is disappearing down the plughole (into 
natural sinks such as the oceans and biota), the rate of ingress is exceeding the rate 
of outflow.  The bath level is rising, and the hue of the dye is getting paler”. (Morgan, 
2009, p. 157)  Carbon dioxide concentrations in the earth’s atmosphere act like a 
thermal blanket, trapping heat in a ‘greenhouse effect’ and, to put it simply, making 
the world hotter.    
 
Taking all these indicators of warming and change together, and looking at the net 
warming effect of increased and long-term carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere, scientists agree that the pattern is beyond any natural projection, and 
very likely to have been caused by human activity, in particular fossil fuel burning 
and changing agricultural practices.  “Human greenhouse gas emissions have an 
overall influence on impacts around the world, because there is no other way to 
explain the global-scale agreement between greenhouse gas concentrations, the 
pattern of global temperature increases, and the documented effects that have 
followed increasing temperatures on every continent and in most oceans”. 
(Reisinger, 2009, p. 60)   The importance of identifying human causes and factors in 
climate change lies in considering approaches to addressing its effects, as will be 
discussed later in this paper.  
 
The effects of anthropogenic climate change can affect the environment in ways 
that, depending on responses to or preparation for those effects, could precipitate 
the uninhabitability of some areas and potentially migration away from affected 
areas.  The effects of a warming climate, in conjunction with the changes to currents 
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and weather patterns (e.g. precipitation, cloudiness, extreme events), cause sea 
level rise.  Climate change is also having a gradual effect on changing weather 
patterns which directly affect lives and livelihoods, in particular those of 
communities reliant on subsistence agriculture, fishing, and habitation close to the 
sea, deltas, or in water-deprived areas like deserts.  Changes to weather can also 
cause flooding, and possibly influence extreme weather events (Canziani et al, 2007; 
Morgan, 2009; Reisinger, 2009; Barnett, 2003).  There is a wide range of other 
effects of climate change, including flooding, wildfires, drought, extremes of hot and 
cold temperatures, and ocean acidification, caused by increased atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide.   
 
Climate change is not the only factor that changes environments and affects human 
activity.  Natural factors that change weather and land include tectonic movement, 
patterns of land movement such as longshore drift and erosion, and the movement 
of land and water from flooding and wind (Canziani et al, 2007; Morgan, 2009; 
Reisinger, 2009).  Small island states (SIS) such as Kiribati and Tuvalu in the Pacific 
are particularly vulnerable to such effects of climate change, because of their small 
size, relative isolation, and limited human resource capacity to counter the changes 
taking place.  Hodgkinson et al identify small island states as likely to be first and 
worst affected by the effects of climate change in their proposed Convention for 
Climate Change Displaced Persons (CCCDP), and part of their proposal specifically 
addresses the inhabitants of small island states (Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson, and 
Young, 2010). 
 
Climate change and natural processes all affect ecosystems and land in ways that 
may make it difficult, undesirable or, at worst, impossible for people to continue a 
realistic and meaningful life on affected land.  Some effects are likely to be 
particularly important for SIS.  Warm oceans can lead to coral bleaching, which in 
turn provides less food and a degraded habitat for fish and other sea life that 
provide the sustenance and livelihood for people living on a nearby shoreline.  That 
shoreline may be subject to a compounding effect of climate-change-induced sea 
level rise and tectonic movement (which could theoretically cancel each other out, 
 13 
depending on the direction of tectonic movement), resulting in less shoreline and 
diminished buffer for more frequent and intense extreme weather events such as 
cyclones.   
 
Sea level rise can increase the salinity of fresh water lenses in islands and atolls, by 
increasing the pressure that sea water puts on the earth around the lens, which in 
turn causes leaching through the soil.  A pressure change can also alter the level of 
the water table, lowering the amount and physical level (distance from the ground) 
of fresh water relative to salt water.   These water-related effects of climate change 
are likely to have particularly profound impacts on small island states in the Pacific, 
and could be a factor driving migration. However, changes to sea level or availability 
of fresh water are not necessarily climate-change-related.    
 
Following a period of almost no change in sea level rise between 0 AD and 1900, the 
IPCC warned in its 2007 report of “strong evidence of global sea level rising” at an 
increasing rate.  Sea level is projected to rise at an even greater rate in the next 
century (Canziani et al, 2007).  Sea level rise has three causes – first is thermal 
expansion, where warm water particles take up more space than cool water 
particles, and this phenomenon is expected to account for about half the total rise 
for the twentieth century.  The second cause is tectonic change – both the natural 
movement of the earth’s plates which can lower or raise land (the latter seen in the 
changes to the height above sea level of the Cartaret Islands), and the tectonic 
recovery of the earth’s crust through expansion as the large ice caps melt, or when 
“liberated from the burden of ice masses”, as Morgan poetically put it. (Morgan, 
2009, p. 130) Third, the melting of ice releases fresh water into the oceans, 
increasing total volume. (Canziani et al, 2007; Morgan, 2009; Barnett, 2003).  
 
The projections for sea level rise this century vary widely.  The IPCC’s estimates 
(widely used by academics and scientists) are based on a number of potential 
scenarios and range from 0.18 to 0.59 metres.  Others have taken a more extreme 
possible range, and come up with 1-2 metres (Allison et al, in Carius and Maas, n.d.).  
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The uncertainty in these figures rests on the behaviour of the other causal factors, 
particularly the response of ice sheets to the warming climate (Reisinger, 2009).  
Sea level rise is not necessarily linear and uniform across a region, and depends on 
the sum of various factors.  In relation to the Pacific, other factors include ‘growing’ 
coral islands due to normal coral development and tectonic processes, and regional 
variations (Nicholls, 2003).  Some Pacific Island countries are particularly vulnerable 
because of their low elevation (Tuvalu being only 4.6 metres above sea level at its 
highest point), their high ratio of coastline, and relative isolation. Adaptation to sea 
level rise is vital and unavoidable, given the IPCC predictions and current trends.  The 
extent and cost of the effects of sea level rise depend on various factors, including 
the pace and mix of adaptation activities  (Nicholls, 2003).  
 
However, it now seems likely that the rise will be greater than the IPCC’s original 
predictions, and beyond the 21st century there will probably be substantial 
additional sea level rise.  Mitigation efforts have the slowest effect on sea level rise, 
in comparison to other climate change effects  (Nicholls, 2003).  
 
All of the natural changes discussed above pose challenges for countries particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and those in the Pacific face a situation 
compounded by the natural features of their lands and ecosystems, and the human 
activity of their inhabitants.  For the Pacific Islands, a natural factor that can increase 
vulnerability to climate change effects includes a high proportion of low-lying coastal 
land, which is often subject to severe erosion during seasonal storms and natural 
processes.  Many Pacific Island countries comprise clusters of small islands isolated 
from large landmasses.  Atoll countries such as Kiribati are particularly vulnerable, 
which has 32 very low-lying atolls (and one island), spread over an area of ocean the 
size of India, and far from other countries.  Such countries are reliant on small fresh 
water lenses, and are at the mercy of rainfall for their replenishment.  (Storey, and 
Hunter, (2010). 
 
Climate change-related migration 
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As discussed, climate change’s environmental effects are potentially negative for 
humans as they combine with other hardship factors and force people to move in 
order to maintain acceptable lives. In examining the state of the international 
approach to the potential problem of people who have had to move to deal with the 
effects of climate change, and the potential contribution made by Hodgkinson, 
Burton, Anderson and Young’s proposal, it is important to be identify who these 
people moving are.  People who may move as a result of the effects of climate 
change are not necessarily considered as part of existing migration definitions, and 
the circumstances around that movement may be different from other types of 
migration. Singling out climate change-related migration suggests that it is a special 
case, which needs a special definition.  As Barnett says, it is less the movement than 
the political and institutional responses to that movement which are important – 
and a definition is a step on the way to determining those responses (Barnett, 2003).  
Without a definition, is there really a specific problem that needs attention?  
 
Dun and Gemenne provide the most succinct answer “…[definitions] determine 
entitlement to rights and establish the threshold for accessing any protection 
regime” (Dun and Gemenne, 2008).  The international community has discovered a 
gap in managing climate change-related movement of people, and is seeking starting 
points for dealing with it.  Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s proposed 
Convention is one possible springboard, but there is not yet international consensus 
on what the problem of climate-change-related migration encompasses or how to 
identify its subjects.   
 
When attempting to develop a definition to cover climate change-related 
movement, it is necessary to be very careful about causality and the edges of the 
problem (as noted above).  Many factors can be involved in a decision to migrate, 
and while they can coalesce around a person’s environment, climate change may be 
only one factor of the combined causes of lifestyle degradation.  Thus it is important 
to be selective about terminology – whether “environmental” or “climate change” 
should be the prefix to “migration”.  This may seem to be splitting hairs, but the 
prefix would be important in the event that, for example, an insurance company or 
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international organisation required a degree of certainty as to the cause of 
movement (and associated loss) for which they are providing compensation and 
assistance.  As above, attributing the reason for migration solely to climate change is 
nigh impossible, as is proving that climate change was the predominant or sole  
cause of a particular environmental degradation.   
 
The use of the prefix “environmental” could include factors such as the negative 
impacts of public works projects such as dams, or problems from over-intensive 
farming of unsuitable land  (Myers, 2001).  Within the possible definition itself are 
two terms with complex meanings.  “Climate change” is a difficult term in and of 
itself, when really what is meant in contexts such as this, is ‘the effects of climate 
change on the environment that were negative from the perspective of human life 
as we know it’.  The IPCC has been clear that climate change is a hugely complex 
scientific phenomenon, and it is not always possible, if ever, to determine what 
specific events or effects on a local scale are ‘climate change’ and what comprise 
weather and normal environmental processes and fluctuations.  The definition’s 
second component also causes difficulties in a clear definition including the subjects 
- the ‘migrants’ or ‘refugees’.   
 
Media reporting often uses the term ‘climate change refugees’, which conveys a 
sense of compulsion, and urgency, of people fleeing  (Mortreux, and Barnett, 2009, 
105).  The rights of refugees are protected under international law.   The Refugee 
Convention provides a system for protecting the rights of people rendered stateless 
because of political or religious persecution, including when the state has been the 
persecutor.  However, people who move (temporarily, permanently, internally or 
externally) in relation to the effects of climate change are not stateless and 
therefore they still have an entity (the state) that is responsible for protecting their 
rights (Burson, 2010; Barnett, 2003).  Therefore, ‘refugee’ is not necessarily 
appropriate in this context.  
 
A suitable definition around climate change-related movement of people would help 
direct identification of those likely to be affected, and focus a response. Finding a 
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useful and appropriate definition for climate change-related movement of people is 
a source of much discussion among academics and others involved in the field.  
Consensus is forming that using the term ‘refugee’ is not helpful (as indicated 
above), and its use is to be avoided, to prevent undermining its normative weight for 
those classified as refugees under the Refugee Convention (Black, 2001; Barnett, 
2003).  Furthermore, “Climate change refugee” and “environmental refugee” are 
terms with no legal basis under international law regardless of how widely they are 
used.  People in the Pacific and other climate change-related migrants have also 
expressed opposition to the use of the term as it suggests that they have no choice 
in their movement, and that their rights are covered by an international system – 
neither of which is the case  (Macey, 2009; Barnett, 2001). 
 
Yet in order to be able to usefully discuss ways to deal with the issues that arise 
when people have to move for reasons that may include the negative effects of 
climate change on their environment, some sort of definition needs to be found.  
While it may make the most sense in terms of specifically codifying motivations for 
movement, “environmental migration” is somewhat broader than what is needed to 
accurately address the issue of climate change-related migration, which has a strong 
focus on the effects of climate change.   
 
Most often used now (and to better effect) are the phrases “climate-induced 
migration” and “climate migrants”, with “environmental migrants” in the vanguard 
for situations more related to environmental issues than climate change such as 
flooding, volcanoes, etc (International Organisation for Migration, 2004).  The Asian 
Development Bank uses “climate-induced migration” and “climate migrant” to 
“…refer to the persons or groups who, for compelling reasons of climate-induced 
changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are 
obliged to move from their habitual homes, or choose to do so, within their country 
of residence or abroad” (Asian Development Bank, 2011, 5).  These definitions give 
the best sense of the nexus between climate change and the movement of people, 
and the best basis for thinking about how to formulate an approach to dealing with 
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the possible effects of climate change migration in the Pacific region and further 
afield. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, and acknowledging the complexity of decisions to 
migrate (as discussed in Section B), the definition used will be “climate change-
related migration”.  This is selected to incorporate the idea that climate change is 
not the only factor that caused migration from a particular area, and to assume so 
(as suggested in ‘climate-induced migration’) is over-simplifying and unhelpful.   
 
The potential problem 
The effects of climate change on natural and human environments, possibly in 
conjunction with a range of other factors, may affect peoples’ lives to an extent that 
the inhabitants of a particularly affected area need to move away to continue a 
meaningful, productive and less threatened life.  Depending on their specific 
situation, they could move a short distance to where the threats and effects are 
lesser, or further afield to a more distant part of their country, or in some cases they 
could move to another country entirely.  These movements are likely to be of a type 
and manner that is not currently provided for under existing human rights and 
people-movement instruments.  
 
There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the extent of the possible problem of 
climate change-related migration, in terms of how many people will be affected. In 
part this uncertainty relates to the scientific prediction around the physical effects of 
climate change, as it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict when the 
effects of climate change will reach a point at which people need to move from an 
area. The uncertainty also relates to the wide range of human and environmental 
resilience to the effects of climate change, and the complexity of people’s decision-
making around migration.     
 
As will be shown in Section B, the connection between the effects of climate change 
on the environment and peoples’ decisions around movement is not linear or simple.  
Humans have always and will continue to move for a variety of reasons and to a 
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variety of locations, and there is a system of legal frameworks that has built up over 
time to manage the movement of people and protect them during their moves.  
 
The system was constructed on the basis of movement that stems from different 
motivations, and is generally of a different type, than that induced by environmental 
problems such as the effects of climate change. This design and functionality in itself 
is not the system’s detriment, but it is argued that the framework is inappropriate 
for dealing with climate change-related migration.   
 
In the absence of a suitable framework, small island states, such as those in the 
Pacific, are particularly vulnerable to the potential for climate change-related 
migration on two fronts: the geographical-geological, and the socio-political.  Those 
states that are most likely to develop climate change-related migrants have neither 
the physical nor human resources to deal internally with climate change-related 
migration, nor the political weight to effect a formal global approach to the problem.   
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Section B 
 
Current approaches to the potential 
problem of climate change-related 
migration  
 
This section examines the existing migration theory and approaches to dealing with 
potential triggers for migration, arguing that the effects of climate change intersect 
with human activity with migration as one possible option for dealing with the 
impact of climate change.  Migration is not a new, unique or simple process, and 
non-environmental human factors play a significant part in the causes of migration.  
The thesis argues that narrowing our focus to climate change related factors 
overlooks and risks over-simplifying the process of migration.  The thesis argues that 
migration theory provides a useful background but there are difficulties using it to 
address potential climate change related migration because of a lack of clarity 
around numbers of those potential migrants, possible actions to mitigate the effects 
of climate change, and individuals’ complex decision making processes. 
 
Portrayal of the effects of climate change in the context of possible migration can 
also be unhelpfully over-simplified. For example, in the Pacific the complex 
interrelationship between isolation, scarce resources, lack of infrastructure and 
urbanization trends are often overlooked and can be rolled up together and 
attributed to climate change.  It is argued that this changes the appreciation of and 
approaches to dealing with the effects of climate change, which could be addressed 
and mitigated through a spectrum of adaptation and mitigation activities.  There is a 
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range of regional and international approaches within which the potential for 
climate change related migration can be addressed, but it is argued that by and large 
these operate independently and without sufficient consideration of the complexity 
of migration decisions.  
 
Current approaches to the potential problem of climate change-related migration 
cover various angles of the issue but remain fledgling and disparate.  Generally, they 
deal with one aspect of possible option, such as migration, and do not approach the 
issue as a whole (for example taking into account the adaptation – migration 
spectrum). Approaches remain relatively unformed due to the difficulty of 
identifying likely numbers, whether states will mitigate to an extent that has a 
significant positive impact on the effects of climate change as they relate to 
potential migration, and difficulty of planning for such an amorphous potential issue 
with all its complexities of decision-making and political uncertainty.    
 
The complexity of framing current work on the issue of climate change-related 
migration is illustrated by a much-publicised case from the Pacific a case that, 
despite its presentation is not climate change-related migration.  The case of the 
Cartaret Islanders is often held up as one of the first instances of climate change-
related migration.  2,600 islanders relocated from the Cartaret Islands to 
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, subsequently relocated to another island and 
then, after some time, decided to move back to their original habitations despite the 
degradation to the environment. However, the less told side of the story is that the 
degradation to their environment was not in fact caused by the effects of climate 
change (Boncour and Burson, in Burson, 2010, p 11).  It may be that at some point in 
the future the Cartaret Islanders find their land more permanently uninhabitable, 
and need to move again.  The cyclical nature of the Cartaret Islanders’ migration 
shows that movements are not permanent, simple or related to climate change.  
Other resettlements related to environmental degradation, sometimes of whole 
communities, have taken place in Kiribati, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands, to name a 
few (Bedford and Bedford, in Burson, 2010).  
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The Pacific is often pointed to as containing states likely to be affected by climate 
change-related migration in the near future, if migrations such as those mentioned 
above are not already linked to the effects of climate change.  Containing many small 
island states with fragile ecosystems and human resources, compounded by 
geographical isolation (not to mention being particularly photogenic), the Pacific is in 
some senses an ideal poster-child for the potential problem of climate change-
related migration.  Migration within the Pacific in relation to environmental factors is 
not a new phenomenon, but climate change and socio-economic issues have 
contributed significant additional challenges.  “Climate change has the potential to 
affect almost every issue linked to poverty and development in the Pacific.  It is also 
likely to exacerbate the vulnerabilities of already marginalised sections of society, 
including women and indigenous communities, and threaten the sustainability of 
traditional subsistence lifestyles.  The impacts of climate change, therefore, must be 
seen in the context of existing poverty and vulnerability in the region” (Burson, 2010, 
p. 63).  
 
Barnett and Chamberlain suggest that in influencing a decision to migrate in the 
Pacific, “…social processes that create poverty and marginality are more important 
factors than environmental changes per se” (Barnett and Chamberlain in Burson, 
2010, p. 51).  This is a crucial point to keep in mind when considering approaches to 
climate change-related migration, particularly in conjunction with development 
assistance programmes and immigration policies.  New Zealand’s geographical 
proximity, strong historical ties to the Pacific and its people (including former and 
current constitutional relationships with the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau), and 
socio-cultural similarities place it in a strong position to be instrumental in 
developing policies, in conjunction with the Pacific, to address the conglomeration of 
factors that can precipitate migration.  The contribution could well range across 
international negotiations around agreements to deal with environmental migrants, 
through regional agreements, and into the current UNFCCC negotiations dealing 
with emissions reductions.   
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Current media perceptions of the issue of climate change and migration neither 
particularly constructive nor informative for developing an approach to the issue, 
having a tendency to sensationalist thinking. Adaptation as presented in recent 
media reporting comprises people packing their bags and hoping New Zealand or 
Australia will take them in. This presents migration as the only response to 
environmental degradation and sea level rise in the Pacific, and presents the Pacific 
people as subject to the whims of countries like New Zealand eventually deciding 
whether or not to accept their inundated people (Associated Press, 2010; Macey, 
2009).  Climate change is undoubtedly contributing to a number of environmental 
and other problems in the Pacific, but media coverage tends to overlook the 
interrelated issues discussed above, such as inadequate infrastructure and resource 
management.  
 
The media’s simplistic conceptualisation leaps a gap between doing nothing and 
departing en masse – a gap which is filled with a huge range of options for 
addressing the socio-economic, political and environmental issues which are 
contributing to environmental degradation in the Pacific.  It also over-simplifies the 
relationships between climate change and environmental change, environment and 
migration, and human activity and the environment.  Most importantly perhaps, 
assuming a worst case scenario is the most likely outcome for the Pacific Islands 
presumes that mitigation is inadequate, that adaptation either does not exist, or that 
it will not have any effect on the eventual outcome (for the Islands’ environment) 
(Tevi, 2010).   
 
Migration theory 
 
Migration is often posed as a response to the negative effects of climate change and 
environmental degradation. Migration is widely held up as a policy response, but 
needs to be taken – as with climate change effects – in the wider context of the 
Pacific Islands’ environments.  Movement of people within and between countries is 
not a new phenomenon for the Pacific or its people, who have long travelled around 
the region for many reasons.  There is ample evidence of migration as an adaptive 
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response to environmental factors in the Pacific.  As a strategy to cope with changing 
environmental factors and extreme events such as droughts, hurricanes, and 
flooding, Bedford mentions resettlement programmes of entire communities of I-
Kiribati within their own country and in Fiji (Bedford, 2008; Campbell, 2010).  
Observers should not assume that migration in the Pacific has necessarily been a 
negative experience – in some cases, such as responding to environmental 
fluctuations, is has been shown to strengthen resilience (Barnett and Adger, 2003).  
 
Understanding what relationship, if any, exists between environmental factors and 
migration requires an understanding of what lies behind peoples’ decisions to move.  
In general, there are three broad categories of migration drivers – push, pull, and 
intervening or restricting factors, as described by Black et al:  
“a) factors related to the region or country of origin, including political 
instability and conflict, lack of economic opportunities, and lack of access to 
resources (‘push’ factors); b) factors related to the region or country of 
destination, including the availability of employment and demand for 
workers, higher wages, political stability or access to resources (‘pull’ 
factors); and c) intervening factors that facilitate or restrict migration, 
including ease of transportation, family or social networks, government 
immigration or emigration policies, economic ties such as trade and 
investment linkages, or social and cultural exchanges” (Black et al, 2008, p. 
11). 
 
However, these drivers do not act as neatly on peoples’ motivations as they be 
described.  These factors may apply singly or together in a particular circumstance, 
acting to spur migration.  The relationship between factors at both ends of the 
migration process is possibly the most important in determining why people choose 
to migrate.  “…[C]lassic migration theory posits that people will move from poorer to 
richer regions or from places where there is population pressure on resources to 
places where there is not.  Yet this does not tell us whether the ‘push’ of poverty, or 
the ‘pull’ of economic opportunity is more important, even though this may be 
critical in terms of understanding whether and how much climate change will 
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influence drivers of migration” (Black et al, 2008, p. 11).  Such theories are not as 
applicable to climate-change-related migration as they may have been for previous 
migration patterns.    
 
Push and pull drivers precipitate two types of migration – internal and external.  
Internal constitutes the movement of people within a state’s borders, and in the 
case of the Pacific this can include movement between islands or atolls of the same 
state.  External is the movement of people across state borders.  Recent research 
seems to provide evidence of both internal and external migration as a result of 
environmental factors, but on close inspection Black finds the academic case for 
environmental factors being the driver unconvincing (particularly the much-quoted 
Myers).  The examples presented often skate over the numerous other factors that 
were taken into account in subjects’ decisions to move, such as land inheritance 
rules and political influence.  Quoted statistics often have enormous ranges for 
migration figures, for example twelve to twenty-four million, which sometimes do 
not take into account important statistical aspects such as population growth (Black 
et al, 2008, pp. 2-3).  Black et al. also note that it is difficult to make statistical and 
causative judgements about the relationship between environmental factors and 
migration decisions due to sheer lack of information – “…where existent, databases 
are weak at best” (Black et al, 2008, p. 3). 
 
Statistics detailing migration flows could help anticipate and prepare policies for 
managing migration flows at origin and destination, and adaptation policies in 
countries of origin.  Black suggests that the best way to predict future migration 
flows is to identify the sensitivity of migration drivers to climate change and 
variability. However, Black acknowledges that there is usually an insufficient 
evidential base to make clear predictions (Black, 2001). In attempting to codify 
possible climate change-related migration, Barnett and Webber identify seven 
general types of migration, as follows:  
1. international labour migrants 
2. internal labour migrants 
3. internal displacement 
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4. international displacement 
5. internal permanent migrants 
6. international permanent migrants 
7. relocation of communities. 
Barnett and Webber’s categorisation is useful for understanding climate change 
induced migration as they reflect that migration is not necessarily permanent – it is 
eminently possible for temporary migration to be an effective coping strategy.  They 
suggest that the latter three categories of migrants are most likely to face the 
greatest risks to their livelihoods and rights through migration, and therefore are the 
most in need of protection and assistance from governments (Barnett and Webber, 
2010).  It is loosely these three categories that Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and 
Young seek to provide for under their proposed Convention.  
 
 
Human activity and environmental change 
 
While there is no doubt that Pacific small island states are by nature predisposed to 
being particularly vulnerable to climate change, positing the inhabitants as passive 
recipients of a bad hand is over-simplifying the situation.  That would suggest that 
the people of the islands have no agency for managing these vulnerable 
environments, making neither good nor bad changes to their immediate 
environment.   
 
The consequences of sea level rise fit broadly into three categories: submergence 
and flooding, salination of surface and ground waters, and morphological change 
such as erosion and wetland loss (Nicholls, 2003).  Sea level rise has high potential 
impacts, including erosion and flooding of low-lying areas, salination of fresh water 
lenses, rising water tables needed for human and agricultural use, damage to coastal 
infrastructure, and damage to businesses, tourism, crops, soil productivity and burial 
sites.  
 
Nicholls commented that, “…human-induced changes in coastal zones are 
widespread and often profound” (Nicholls, 2003, p. 7).  Coastal erosion can be 
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exacerbated by the use of beaches as a source of building materials, removal of 
mangroves and similar vegetation, and by a lack of building and planning regulation.  
High (and increasing) population densities put pressure on limited fresh water 
resources, land availability, and minimal infrastructure.  A lack of basic 
infrastructure, particularly waste and sewerage, undermines local ecosystems and 
pollutes fresh and salt water (in addition to the associated health problems).  In the 
case of Kiribati, “…sanitation methods including traditional defecation at the beach 
or in the bush and pit toilets are still the most frequent.  Most human and solid 
waste continues to be dumped in open spaces and along waterfronts, and water 
catchments have been gradually overrun with housing in the absence of effective 
land-use planning and regulation” (Storey and Hunter, 2010, p. 173). 
 
Pollution of fresh and salt water has flow-on effects on local agricultural and 
fisheries production systems, and also damages fragile ecosystems such as coral 
reefs. Damage to reefs has subsequent effects on fish stocks.  Agricultural 
production system modernisation also increased vulnerability, as cash crops 
(monoculture) are less resistant than polyculture to extreme weather events and 
ecosystem changes, and are less effective at maintaining good balances of nutrients 
in soils. (Barnett and Adger; Storey and Hunter)  Referring particularly to Kiribati, 
Storey and Hunter found that “[t]he impacts of unmanaged urbanisation, a 
continuing crisis of inadequate sanitation, a lack of solid waste disposal controls and 
ineffective freshwater management offer [compared to climate change] equal 
threats to sustainability, even if they proffer less ‘sensational headlines’” (Storey and 
Hunter, 2010, p.167).  
 
The combination of Pacfic Islands’ land’s natural state, weather process and human 
activity, in conjunction, render the Pacific Islands particularly vulnerable to climate 
change. Generally, the Pacific Islands have low levels of development, small-scale 
government sectors, industry, infrastructure, and adaptive capacity for dealing with 
the effects of climate change. In conjunction, there is a negative effect on countries’ 
ability to act as fast and comprehensively as seems to be necessary to deal with the 
effects of climate change.  There are also tensions between priorities, over time - for 
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example whether to address immediate and longstanding development challenges 
such as health, education and basic infrastructure, or to focus on adaptation to 
climate change.  There is an increasing awareness of the need to mainstream climate 
change policies into existing development programmes and policies, and more 
activity to this end.   
 
Non-climate change-related priorities and challenges often have a negative impact 
on a state’s ability to response to the effects of climate change as quickly and 
comprehensively as necessary.  Development support and aid is provided to Pacific 
countries through bilateral channels (development agencies) and by non-
governmental and international organisations, to assist with developing sustainable 
and effective infrastructure to address existing development issues such as waste 
management and energy production.  Development agencies and international 
organisations (such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, for example) 
bring particular focus and political agendas to bear in the implementation of their 
assistance, regardless of rhetoric around objectivity and country-driven strategies 
(Barnett and Adger, 2003).  It is unsurprising that countries with low state capacity 
are inclined to tailor requests to funding rather than building strategies and then 
requesting funding.  A focus on developing tourism and economic sustainability 
draws scarce local government attention and resources away from basic 
infrastructure and services.  Comprehensive integrated policy should not distinguish 
between good development and good (or ‘good’) climate change adaptation 
(Barnett and Adger, 2003).  In this context, climate change should not be seen as a 
separate challenge but an exacerbating factor. 
 
The intensity and magnitude of the Pacific Islands’ plight under climate change is not 
a foregone conclusion, and action by both the islanders and the international 
community can make a huge difference to the eventual situation in these countries.  
There is now a great opportunity to develop practical, flexible and feasible policies at 
local, national, regional and international levels. The islands’ inhabitants may not 
have been part of the Industrial Revolution’s climate degradation but should not buy 
into the international tendency to see Pacific Islanders through a lens of vulnerability 
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which posits them as passive recipients of fate. Rather, they could take responsibility 
for developing their island’s futures and protecting their environments (Barnett and 
Adger, 2003).  To a certain extent drawing international attention to the potential 
problem of sea level rise leading to forced migration in the Pacific islands is 
empowering, demonstrating international-level promotion to attract money and 
development assistance to assist with adaptation, and, ideally, prevent the need to 
migrate at all.  
 
The adaptation – migration spectrum 
 
The spectrum of actions from adaptation to migration shows the range of options for 
responding to the effects of climate change.  Migration is not the only response, and 
adaptation may in some cases reduce the likelihood of it being a necessary response, 
but in itself has a range of activities from (for example) sea wall extension to 
producing different types of crops and changing urban development patterns.  
Adaptation is vital not just to narrow the gap between effects and action, but also to 
as far as possible enable people to make choices about their own and their land’s 
future, rather than reaching a situation where choices have been reduced to where 
to migrate. Migration as an adaptive response is generally viewed as a mix of a 
coping strategy, for example where it helps reduce the population pressure on an 
island’s scarce water or land resources, and of a longer-term strategy.  
 
Given the longevity of the problem of climate change and the consequences of 
adaptive actions like migration, it is vital that a long-term view of the issue and 
potential responses is taken – beyond political terms and even the lifetimes of those 
developing responses.  Timeframes are very uncertain, despite the degree of 
committed global warming (Canziani et al, 2007, p. 68), and addressing climate 
change effects is not an issue that should be deferred into the next political cycle or 
further.  There is also a considerable body of work showing that addressing the 
effects of climate change earlier is better and cheaper in the long run than delaying 
until the effects are more severe and widespread.  (Garnaut, 2008; Stern, 2006)  
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Migration is attractive in sounding like a simple and suitably distant solution to a 
complex and contentious issue, and also helpfully avoids the expense associated 
with adaptation of an island that may cease to exist or become uninhabitable after 
the next large storm surge, or earthquake (or passage of time and sea-level rise).  
However, migration en masse from a country (such as Kiribati) raises a host of side 
questions that are interesting focus of academics’ and policy-makers’ attention.  
These include issues of sovereignty, international law, economic rights to EEZ’s 
resources, and the many socio-cultural and socio-political complexities associated 
with transplanting people into what may be an entirely new and in some cases 
possibly unwelcoming context (Barnett, 2003; Burson, 2010; Macey, 2009).  
 
There is an opportunity for affected countries to work with neighbours and other 
states to develop mutually beneficial, practical policies to dealing with the effects of 
climate change and managing environmental protection, drawing on and including 
the work of international organisations and non-governmental organisations such as 
the Pacific Conference of Churches and the Pacific Islands Forum.   
 
Broadly, there are two pillars on which climate change policy response frameworks 
are proposed – mitigation and adaptation.  Migration obviously falls under the ambit 
of adaptation, which is a hugely broad term of reference covering options 
dovetailing with the development spectrum, and including migration.  
 
The first pillar, mitigation, comprises human intervention to reduce the sources 
and/or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (Canziani et al, 2007).  Mitigation is 
undoubtedly necessary in terms of preventing further future effects of climate 
change, but because of the longevity of carbon in the atmosphere, the world is 
already committed to a period of warming and effects regardless of current action – 
even if all emitting stopped now.  Mitigation in the Pacific relates primarily to 
renewable energy and avoided deforestation.  Forests are an effective sink for 
greenhouse gases (as well as having wider ecosystem benefits), and the UNFCCC 
includes programmes to provide financial and other incentives for reducing 
deforestation in countries like Papua New Guinea (UNFCCC, 2010).  
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For mitigation to have a significant impact on sea level rise and other relevant 
problems in the Pacific islands, the biggest emitters (the US, China, India, and the EU, 
among others) need to take significant measures to limit their emissions (Canziani et 
al, 2007; New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2010).  Achieving this is an issue 
for another piece of work – well beyond the scope of this thesis.  Mitigation is above 
all a long-term response, and, given our respective emissions profiles, not one in 
which New Zealand and the Pacific can on their own make an impact significant 
enough to affect sea level rise in the region.   
  
The other policy pillar, adaptation, can reduce the impact of the effects of climate 
change and increase resilience in the future (UNFCCC, 2010 (a)).  Adaptation 
encompasses a range of actions and should be an integral part of development 
activity in developing countries.  In addition to the UNFCCC-led processes such as the 
Nairobi Work Plan and Cancun Adaptation Framework, there is a proliferation of 
agreements, statements and action plans for addressing climate change effects at 
local and regional level, including the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on 
Climate Change (SPREP, 2005).  Adaptation actions that will have flow-on effects for 
land productivity, health, and water supply sustainability, for example improving 
sewerage and fresh water management infrastructure, could be of highest priorities 
for countries like Kiribati.  In general, adaptation planning should avoid duplication 
of efforts, and therefore it is essential to scope what action and planning is already 
underway and look at potential for modification of existing systems before creating 
new (and potentially costly) systems (Eastwood, 2009).   
 
The complexity of migration drivers themselves and the difficulty of creating a policy 
dealing with climate change migrants interacts with other factors such as the long-
term, slow-onset nature of the problem and the general sensitivity of migration 
issues in the domestic political context.  Currently, the evidence for New Zealand 
needing a specific climate change migration policy is not compelling.  However, the 
issue is not going to disappear and it is worth considering whether there is a need for 
more reliable information and thinking about how states such as New Zealand can 
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work together with affected states such as those in the Pacific to address the 
prospect of climate change-related migration, including working to create a situation 
where migration is not necessary. 
 
Regional and international approaches 
 
Human rights frameworks 
Existing human rights norms and mechanisms will be broadly applicable to potential 
climate change-related migrants.  However, they were not established with such 
migrants and situations in mind, and therefore there are aspects that may not apply 
as neatly as to other situations.  One of the issues most exercising academics looking 
at possible approaches to dealing with the potential for climate change-related 
migration is statelessness.  Whether a country is no longer a state when it is 
inundated or rendered uninhabitable is a matter of international legal debate.  In 
terms of responsibility to protect rights this is related to the obligations of the state 
whose population has largely migrated – can the state, and by extension its people, 
still be said to have rights over their Exclusive Economic Zone, is the state still 
responsible for peoples’ rights even if they have migrated to another country, what 
political and fiscal relationship exists between the state on remaining land and its 
people offshore1? Although it is important in the wider context of climate change 
migration, detailed discussion of the issue of climate-change-related statelessness 
does not fall within the scope of this paper.  
 
Peoples have rights even if they move from their homes, and they also have an 
additional set of needs directly related to their migration, which may require 
assistance and support in addition to the protection of their rights.  External 
migration (across state borders) in particular is an expensive process, and there are 
obvious potential issues related to establishing a new life with which migrants may 
need assistance.  These could include financial or logistical assistance to move, 
support to maintain their cultural and social ties, and so on.  The burden of                                                         
1 For example, the 1,500 inhabitants of Niue can vote.  The 20,000 Niueans in New Zealand have no 
means of political representation or influence on the island or its government.  Niue could be an 
interesting test-case for climate change migrants wanting to maintain political involvement in 
decision-making about their island’s future.  
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responsibility for climate change – excessive greenhouse gas emissions – is often 
seen as imposing a corollary obligation to protect and support those forced to move 
because of it2.  
 
(As discussed in Section A, it is important to remember that ‘climate change refugee’ 
and ‘environmental refugee’ are terms with no legal basis under international law 
regardless of how many people use them.  Quite apart from the lack of legal 
recognition, there is rising opposition to such terms among those who have the 
potential to become climate change-related migrants (Macey, 2009;  Barnett, 2003)).  
 
Pacific initiatives 
 
The Pacific, as a region and through specific states with a vested interest in this area, 
has become the forum for frequent discussions on dealing with the effects of climate 
change and the potential for related migration at some point in the future.  In the 
absence of a suitable policy space for climate change migration, Boncour and Burson 
recognise that “…a window of opportunity exists to place the human mobility and 
humanitarian consequences of climate change at the heart of the international 
policy debate on climate change. We hope the peoples of the South Pacific can be 
part of shaping this discussion” (Boncour and Burson, in Burson, 2010, pp. 10-11).  
However, policy development on such a broad, complex, and potentially sensitive 
international issue as this will necessarily be a labour-intensive and resource-heavy 
task if it is to be comprehensive and effectively linked to other policies, 
organizations, and regional or international schemes that may develop. In this sense, 
Pacific states can be at a disadvantage due to their size and resource availability.                                                          
2 This idea is called ‘historical responsibility’, and is generally used in various contexts (aid, 
negotiations, climate change politicking) to make the case that the developed world should cover the 
costs of adapting to and mitigating climate change.  However, ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ is not 
always as clear a division as it seems standing at either end of the spectrum.  For example, Singapore 
is a ‘developing’ country under the UNFCCC, listed in Annex II; whereas if the measure of 
development were based on GDP Singapore would sit well within the ‘developed’ group of Annex I 
countries.  Furthermore, New Zealand was hardly a heavily industrialised and polluting country during 
the 19th and 20th centuries, and China now leads the US in rate of emissions. (US Energy Information 
Administration, 2010 – ‘An atlas of pollution: the world in carbon dioxide emissions’.)  The developed-
developing nexus can be a dangerously complex generalisation in relation to climate change and 
historical responsibility, and can obscure more important issues like vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity (which can include things like the amount of land available, human resources, and land 
infrastructure). 
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However the pertinence of these issues ensure that climate change is a frequent 
issue for discussion within Pacific groupings, and its prominence is also increasing at 
wider international discussions. There have been a number of important and fruitful 
discussions within the region, and notable instances of drawing attention to the 
issue on an international scale, as follows.  In 2007 the Pacific countries were 
instrumental in facilitating a UN Security Council Debate, and subsequent General 
Assembly Resolution (UNGA A/64/281) on climate change and security.  New 
Zealand Permanent Representative H.E. Rosemary Banks delivered a statement to 
the UNSC in support of the resolution, which recognized the particular vulnerability 
of Pacific Island countries to climate change and the threats it poses to their 
environments and the viability of societies.  Importantly, the New Zealand statement 
also recognized that assistance from the international community “…needs to be 
sufficiently nuanced to allow for different risk and development circumstances and 
to various national contexts…[and] also support the objectives of recipient states in 
order to ensure local ownership [of adaptation] and practical results” (New Zealand, 
2007).  Two themes that New Zealand has consistently supported through the UN 
and many other parallel processes such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are 
encouraging flexible support and policies to fit different Pacific (and international) 
contexts, and country-driven policy development and ownership (Eastwood, 2009; 
Plume, 2009).  
 
Signed in August 2008, the Niue Declaration was the first comprehensive PIF 
statement on climate change, and laid out the key issues for and challenges faced by 
the region, acknowledging the particularly vulnerable situation of many of its 
countries.  This Declaration also makes specific mention of the possibility of climate 
change migration, encouraging “the Pacific’s Development Partners to increase their 
technical and financial support for climate change action on adaptation, mitigation 
and, if necessary, relocation” (Niue Declaration, 2008).  It also encouraged Pacific 
countries to act with the assistance of partners to address pressing issues and build 
capacity and resilience.   The Declaration is also important in that it specifically refers 
to the Pacific peoples’ ambition to live in their own homes, insofar as possible.   
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In the 2010 PIF communiqué, climate change warranted a 13-point mention, second 
only in priority to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Pacific Islands 
Forum Communiqué, 2010).  In November 2010 a number of Pacific countries 
(Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, The Maldives, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Solomon 
Islands and Tonga) adopted the Ambo Declaration at the close of the Kiribati Climate 
Change conference (the US, UK and Canada were observers).  This Declaration 
included a specific reference to climate change migration, but interestingly, 
narrowed the field of reference to migration “…as a result of adverse effects arising 
from climate change extreme events” (Ambo Declaration, 2010).  Theoretically, this 
rules out migration as a consequence of sea level rise or other gradual processes 
such as declining rainfall or decreased availability and quality of fresh water.  It is 
also silent on what constitutes ‘climate change extreme events’ – given the 
difficulties of attributing an event such as a cyclone or flood to climate change, such 
a narrow definition seems potentially short-sighted.  On the other hand, a definition 
referring to ‘the adverse effects of climate change’ would be broad enough to 
encompass the myriad climate change effects discussed above that could precipitate 
migration.  However, the Declaration does not bind states to any actions, so the 
specific formulation of the definition is only of academic interest, unless it is later 
picked up by more active agreements.   
 
These documents are only a sample of the work the Pacific countries have 
undertaken with partners in the region and further afield to draw international 
attention to their needs and develop suitable adaptive responses, integrated with 
development planning and assistance.  It is interesting to note that there is little 
mention of the local and human activity factors causing degradation in such 
documents; the focus is solely towards “external” climate change-caused problems.  
Integration with current development plans is a slight nod to this relationship 
between causal factors. 
 
 
Domestic settings: New Zealand 
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The potential and possibly distant nature of climate change-related migration does 
not mean that states’ policy frameworks do not include any aspects that could 
accommodate climate change-related migrant, such as existing migration policy.  
However, states are also the subject of some pressure to create specific policies, 
thereby setting a precedent for future cases of climate change-related migration.   
  
For example, suggestions can include a charge that New Zealand and Australia 
should take the lead on developing an approach to dealing with (supposedly 
inevitable) migration from the Pacific (Coates, 2010).  This stands in direct contrast 
to the views expressed by groups such as the Pacific Conference of Churches, which 
urges the Pacific countries to find their own solutions and address the myriad of 
issues around environmental degradation and migration, with support from New 
Zealand and Australia, but not necessarily being led by others to a solution not of the 
Pacific’s making (Tevi, 2010).  New Zealand and Australia certainly have an existing 
and continued role in facilitating and joining discussions and assisting islands 
(through existing packages of aid) to work at this themselves, and the Pacific 
countries have an interest in helping each other to make the most of their relatively 
scarce resources.    
 
Climate change has drawn attention to the Pacific in a way possibly unprecedented 
by anything other than nuclear testing.  Kiribati and Tuvalu have become poster-
children for climate change-induced sea level rise, and the effects of the developed 
world’s excess on the developing world and its pristine idyllic environments 
(Gemenne and Shen, 2009).  
 
Many media articles and some academic works contain assertions, mysteriously 
uncited, along the lines that New Zealand has been asked, is negotiating to, or has 
offered or refused to take in climate change migrants from Kiribati and Tuvalu.  The 
most well known reference was Al Gore’s in ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (David, Bender 
Burns and Skol, 2006).  In all its forms, this assertion appears to be largely untrue. 
While there have been suggestions by various countries and organisations that New 
Zealand would be a likely candidate for migration from the Pacific countries for the 
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reasons above, thus far none of these suggestions constitute a formal approach by a 
Pacific government to the New Zealand government to which a clear “yea” or “nay” 
would be given (Barnett, 2003).  
 
New Zealand has development, climate change and migration policies related to the 
Pacific but the migration policies are not specifically designed to accommodate 
climate change migration, and development policy does not include specific 
attention to migration (Dunstand and Canham-Harvey, 2009; Eastwood, 2009; 
Barnett and Webber, 2009).  New Zealand currently has two migration policies that 
enable Pacific people to come to New Zealand: the Pacific Access Category, and the 
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy.  The former allows for 250 people from 
Tonga, 75 from Kiribati and 75 from Tuvalu to gain residence in New Zealand each 
year, under a ballot system.  The RSE policy is a “…circular scheme for temporary 
work”, and each year around 8,000 seasonal workers, predominantly from the 
Pacific, come to New Zealand to work.  However, the Department of Labour, which is 
responsible for migration policy, states that “New Zealand has no immigration 
policies presently that respond directly to climate change.  This does not preclude 
policies being developed in the future, but there is currently no mandate to do so” 
(Dunstand and Canham-Harvey, 2009). 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change treaty was 
established to consider what could be done to address the effects of and reduce 
global warming.  Now with 194 State Parties, and the related Kyoto Protocol (which 
has stronger, legally binding measures to reduce emissions but a smaller 
membership of developed countries covering fewer emissions), negotiations are 
continuing to achieve legally-binding commitments to mitigation targets which will 
hold global warming at 2 degrees Celsius (above pre-1990 levels).  The UNFCCC and 
its subsidiary bodies (the implementation arms) also provide a plethora of assistance 
mechanisms and support to developing countries to assist with adaptation to the 
adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC, 2010). 
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Small island countries have formed a group to represent the interests of those most 
vulnerable to climate change, particularly sea level rise, at the UNFCCC negotiations 
– the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).  The group includes the Maldives, Pacific 
countries, and Caribbean states.   
 
At the international level, the UNFCCC specifically covers migration in its latest 
iteration (the ‘Cancun Agreement’, which is still the subject of negotiation), calling 
on Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework, including “ …measures to enhance understanding, coordination and 
cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and 
planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels” 
(UNFCCC, 2010). 
 
While it is useful to have the migration point specifically made, it is made fifth of 
eight in the decision and follows adaptation actions, which would preempt migration 
being necessary, including strengthening of infrastructure and building resilience to 
the future effects of climate change.    Complementary to the UNFCCC, Boncour and 
Burson suggest that the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol should explicitly 
recognize human mobility and humanitarian consequences of climate change at the 
heart of the document, directing the international response to climate change 
(Boncour and Burson, in Burson, 2010).  
 
 
Other initiatives and approaches  
Outside the Pacific, much further investigation work has been done by international 
organizations and academics, including the UN University, Asian Development Bank, 
World Bank, OECD, Refugee Studies Centre, and International Organisation for 
Migration, among others.  By and large, these studies have thoroughly covered the 
ground of causality, the legal frameworks around definition and whether the 
concept of “refugee” and existing international law are adequate. They have also 
skirted the issues around prediction of likely numbers, statistical information and 
difficulties around attribution to make judgements (as is their prerogative).      
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All investigation agrees that the issue of climate change migration is very complex 
and urgently needs attention from the international community of states, as well as 
country-specific, detailed information-gathering to enable development of suitable 
country-led responses.  Many investigations also draw attention to the social and 
economic aspects of migration, and the need not just to address the cause and 
physical move in itself, but also ensure that systems are in place to support migrants 
throughout their move and resettlement.  (Some also pick up on the need for choice 
and potential for moving back and forth, and importantly for not moving as an 
option, regardless of the likelihood of inundation).  
 
However, the work of organizations thus far mostly sets a scene for thinking about 
climate change migration, and notes that more specific information is needed on 
country-level movements and inclinations. Few outside the academic world have 
proposed practical steps and attempted frameworks that could usefully be picked up 
by domestic policymakers and the international community.  Barnett, Bedford and 
Burson all make policy suggestions for New Zealand, and Hodgkinson, Burton, 
Anderson and Young hope to draw states’ attention to and support for their 
proposal, which provides an institutional and theoretical structure that could be 
taken up and developed by countries into an international instrument, possibly 
under the auspices of the UN (Bedford, 2008; Barnett, 2003; Burson, 2010; and 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010). 
  
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young recognise that other proposals addressing 
climate change migration proffer parts of the solution but do not provide a 
comprehensive solution.   Their Convention examines 5 substantive proposals 
(including one of their own earlier iterations) and finds that none has “…offered a 
comprehensive, global solution to the displacement problem; our proposal, which 
builds on our earlier 2008 study, attempts to provide such a solution.”  Briefly 
summarised, Willams’ proposal promotes the development of regional agreements 
under an international framework agreement; Biermann and Boas’ work proffers a 
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protocol to the UNFCCC; and the proposals of Docherty and Giannini, and 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s 2008 study promote global, standalone 
agreements.   
 
Docherty and Giannini’s proposal only provides for people displaced across state 
borders, thereby not addressing the significant likelihood of high volumes of internal 
migrants.  Betaille et al. focus on environmentally displaced people, which is a 
broader catchment than Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young see as needing 
immediate attention.  Willams proposes the development of regional agreements 
under an accord linked to the UNFCCC as part of a post-Kyoto compact.  While the 
period covered by the Kyoto protocol will soon come to an end, negotiations of a 
successor agreement are moving slowly.  With the statements by Japan and others 
that they will not sign up to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
future of a successor agreement looks more likely to sit within the UNFCCC itself.   
 
International environmental accords are at the mercy of states’ willingness to adhere 
to them.  Williams thinks that concerns around state sovereignty would preclude 
success of an international agreement.  This seems a rather spurious argument, 
given that state sovereignty has not prevented the agreement of many other 
international agreements with similar intrusions into a state’s affairs – and state 
sovereignty is an issue that would necessarily be worked through in the drafting of 
any agreement. Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young manage the issue by 
weaving the primacy of the state into their proposal, and no doubt were their 
proposal to come up for negotiation there would be more discussion and framing of 
the issue.   
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Section C 
 
Gaps in current initiatives and approaches  
This section examines the underlying assumptions inherent in discussion of potential 
climate change related migration, that because there is no specific mechanism to 
address climate change-related migration specifically that the perceived gap must be 
filled.  It is asserted that many factors likely to contribute to the need to migrate, 
such as environmental degradation and lack of economic opportunity, are dealt with 
through other mechanisms and arrangements.  Further, that creating a specific 
climate change-related migration mechanism could disadvantage those affected by 
problems that are not obviously linked with climate change.  This section questions 
the presumption that climate change-related migrants should be prioritized above, 
for example, economic migrants.  It addresses the political aspects of the debate 
around potential climate change-related migration and considers the symbolic role 
the image of small island states has come to have in framing the debate and 
approaches. 
 
Despite approaches which have been developed and nascent initiatives as discussed 
in Section B, gaps remain in the possible approach to potential climate change-
related migration at the international level. There is no climate change migration 
equivalent to the Refugee Convention to draw all the disparate elements together, 
and it seems unlikely that the UNFCCC will increase the prominence of the issue to 
the extent that is called for by Barnett, Boncour and Burson, Bedford, the 
International Organisation for Migration, and others. “While existing international 
humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law gives rise to obligations towards some 
of those who may be displaced or migrate from climate change, there are clear gaps 
in these international law protection frameworks” (Burson, 2010, p. 171). 
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However, there is a widespread assumption that the gap means that climate change-
related migrants will not have any protection for their human rights, that they will be 
cast adrift and rendered stateless with no government or relevant international 
organization to protect them in theory.  All people, regardless of their state or lack 
thereof, their migratory or sedentary status, or the label they attach to their type of 
movement, have their rights conferred and protected by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).  However the current international system of states has 
shown that to have these rights protected and met one needs to have a formal 
attachment to a state.  
 
It seems that in the case of climate change-related migrants, the concern is less the 
protection of peoples’ human rights than the maintenance of their connection to a 
state (or two).  The corollary concern is the flexibility of states’ understandings of 
human rights to provide protection and assistance to deal with migration that stems 
from factors outside people’s control, or partly outside their control (in the case of a 
mix of causal factors).  If people move within a state, theoretically the state’s 
protections continue, though they may be directly the subject of a different local 
implementing structure through another council or community.  The tone of 
academic and other commentaries suggests a fear that people’s movements will be 
seen as another movement from choice, rather than a process through which they 
should be entitled to assistance, as would be the case (or at least the expectation) 
with natural disasters.  
 
Practically, the predominant issue around protection of people during movements 
related to climate change is as a result of slow-onset events.  As New Zealand and 
Australia frequently demonstrate in relation to countries in the Pacific, when there is 
a natural disaster, assistance is provided.  It is highly unlikely that such countries 
would suddenly cease to provide assistance when there is a need, or when a request 
is made, simply because the cause of devastation and distress occurs more slowly 
than typical natural disasters.   
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That said, slow-onset events such as sea-level rise and changes to weather (e.g. 
rainfall patterns) or ecological balances (e.g. coral reefs and fish stocks, soil fertility) 
are dealt with through different mechanisms such as development assistance and 
budget support. Should climate change-related migration occur as a result of such 
effects, the established responses of neighbours may not be a given.   
 
States are in all likelihood unwilling to create a precedent for adding to their burden 
of development assistance and contributions to international organizations.  Small 
island states (SIS), with their small populations, typically established migration 
patterns to and agreements with other countries, are one question.  Quite another 
question is the extrapolation of such a support expectation to populous and deltaic 
Bangladesh and India.  
 
It is clear from the work of Bedford, Burson, and others that SIS are likely to be the 
test cases for development of responses to and human rights protections for climate 
change-related migrants.  In both SIS and those such as Bangladesh and India, issues 
of expected response and precedent increase the necessity for understanding and 
practically applying the nexus between adaptation and migration, in part to try and 
avoid hitting the migration end of the spectrum.    
It may be that states are hoping to avoid the necessity of dealing with large-scale, 
unexpected migration by dealing with adaptation and prevention in the interim, 
while trying to come to terms with whether there is in fact a need to develop a 
formal response to climate change-related migration. Migration is best conceived of 
in terms of an adaptive strategy, which would hopefully follow a number of other 
actions.  There is consensus, on top of common sense understanding, that having to 
leave homelands and family because of climate change-related factors should always 
be voluntary, and preferably a last resort (although not necessarily at the last 
minute).   
 
There could be (an understandable) disinclination among policy makers to create a 
separate issue from within its existing ambit.  Climate change adaptation is a broad 
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issue which has international attention and understanding, and is addressed 
prolifically in international agreements and regional activities (including bilateral 
development relationships).  Creating a sub issue from within its ambit is something 
states (and other players) are reluctant to do.  It could also have a negative impact 
on existing work to establish the need and responses to the effects of climate 
change and attempt to reduce emissions. Establishing as a separate issue could 
obscure the need to focus immediately on adaptation, and give a false impression 
that adaptation will not have any significant effect on factors leading to migration, so 
migration is inevitable.   
 
Understandably, there may also be a prioritization of problems in the face of scarce 
resources, those most immediate and pressing being dealt with first. Issues such as 
dealing with changes to rainfall and fresh water availability may be the first changes 
noticed in some countries, and therefore garner more attention than migration or 
soil degradation, which are longer-term issues. Migration could be seen as a failure 
of states’ action and of their responsibilities (under UNDHR) to meet citizens’ needs.  
They would have failed in the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective of enabling ecosystems to 
adapt.  Many states would not want to be the first to be noticed and acknowledged 
in this group.  With the increasing attention and understanding of the issue this is 
less likely, but there remains a possibility for a focus on adaptation rather than 
migration.   
 
The President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, has been very open in the past few years 
about the need for his country to look seriously at relocation of some people in the 
short term (Tong, 2009).  Tong has been noticeably silent on attributing blame for 
the situation deteriorating to this point, but it is clear that mitigation and financing 
to facilitate adaptive measures (including migration) in developing countries 
(particularly SIDS) must come from developed countries.   
 
The strongest voice for the right to relocate comes from Kiribati, particularly in the 
short term.  Most other small island states speak of climate change-related 
migration in terms of a longer-term development, which they are working to 
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incorporate into the many other challenges they are facing and responding to with 
relatively limited resources.  Understandably, the dire and dramatic nature of an 
expectation that your country will be submerged is a useful opportunity for little-
known states to gain attention on an international scale. The potential fate of small 
island states has propelled the issue of climate change-related migration above a 
small number of people on tiny islands in a neighbourhood that has largely kept to 
itself and managed its own business, onto a global stage and attention. With 
attention can come donor and other assistance.  It is hard to argue against the rights 
of a few thousand people from Pacific Islands relocating to another island or 
country, but extrapolate those rights onto the population of Bangladesh or the 
Maldives, and some in the international community realize that more thinking needs 
to be done before taking action.  
 
As discussed in section A, the effects of climate change are complex and often 
unpredictable, and migration itself is a very convoluted and sensitive issue. The 
nexus between the two involves an order of magnitude more complexity.  Climate 
change and migration also fall into the category of what are now being known 
colloquially as the many ‘climate change ands’.  Migration is the ‘and’ that is 
probably more distant than many of the others, both in terms of direct impact on 
the lives of those in what would be host countries, and in terms of time, as migration 
may not be an absolute necessity in our lifetimes for most countries.  As a ‘climate 
change and’ it has to jostle for status against similarly worthy issues which address 
other fundamental human rights, such as climate change and food security, or 
climate change and health.  
 
An approach to whether there is a gap in existing approaches to migration and 
responses to the effects of climate change should also ensure that possible countries 
of origin are not given the impression that migration is their only option so that 
adaptation slides down in intensity.  It is vital, as discussed above, that the people 
and governments of the Pacific Islands undertake adaptation to the adverse effects 
of climate change, with support and financial assistance from other countries, 
including New Zealand.  Gemenne and Shen noted “…the constant characterization 
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of Tuvaluans as potential environmental migrants, or ‘refugees’, can enclose them 
into a relativist trap and prevent them from developing adequate adaptation 
strategies.  This categorization can also result in a loss of confidence” (Gemenne and 
Shen, 2009, p. 28).   
 
Strategically framing the issue of climate change and migration to ensure adequate 
attention to and action from international and domestic communities is a problem 
for its proponents.  While the need to get traction on some sort of approach may be 
obvious and deeply pressing for some people in the government of Tuvalu (for 
example), governments are always facing issues such as natural disasters, financial 
crises, and political challenges that require more immediate and decisive action than 
a distant potential problem.   The government of Tuvalu may also be looking at the 
need to improve roads and access to healthcare for rural communities rather than 
address the effects of climate change.  The international community is often 
diverted from long-term, less dramatic problems by those of short duration and high 
impact such as earthquakes in Haiti or Japan, and rebellion and government 
atrocities in the Middle East, with their associated effects for the global economy 
and oil supply.  Nonetheless, climate change and migration will resurface and the 
calls for an approach to be developed at the international level will return.  
 
There are various potential fora for dealing with climate change migration at an 
international level, within an organized, state-centric arena.  The obvious contenders 
are the UNFCCC and Refugee Convention.  The former is often suggested as a ‘home’ 
for climate change migration issues, or that at the least any mechanism developed 
should be linked to the UNFCCC (Hodgkinson).  The UNFCCC’s raison d’être centres 
on making high-level changes to country behaviour, constructing a framework within 
which implementation actions take place at country and regional level.   
 
An attempt to prioritise climate change migration over other climate change issues 
(such as financing for adaptation or acceptable mitigation commitments in the 
UNFCCC) may in fact backfire, by precipitating a period of negotiating over priority of 
issues, and weaken the UNFCCC’s focus by proliferation of subject matter and 
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negotiation rivulets rather than creating a strong ‘home’ within which climate 
change migration can be dealt with. While there are obvious reasons for avoiding 
duplication of effort and spawning of climate change-related organizations, in the 
case of climate change migration it makes most sense for a discrete consideration, 
albeit linked in to the UNFCCC in some way. 
 
However, the existence of an organization with ‘UN’ and ‘climate change’ in its name 
does not necessarily equate to it being the most appropriate organization for dealing 
with climate change-related migration.  The UNFCCC has a specific focus, on 
managing emissions, and while its ambit is broader than just mitigation, states 
should be wary of encumbering it with tasks better managed elsewhere or under 
another organization. To use the example of another organization with a broad 
ambit, the Food and Agriculture Organisation is not asked to deal with famine-
related migration, so why is the UNFCCC looked to for managing climate change-
related migration?   
 
It is interesting that no commentators seem to have suggested establishment of a 
‘migration organisation’, for example.  Given the complexity of factors involved in 
migration decisions and the increasingly global nature of peoples’ movements, it 
could be useful.  
 
Such an organization could also manage the needs of those who are forced to 
migrate in whole or in part because of economic hardship, which is, like the effects 
of climate change in many cases, not of their making.  In the wake of the financial 
crisis, and with the decline of many European economies and possibly even the Euro, 
many Americans and Europeans found themselves jobless and homeless, or had 
livelihoods have been ruined by war. Those who were directly affected and have to 
migrate are affected by a problem with human causes, but the international 
community is mysteriously silent on the need for an organization and funding to 
support economic migrants.  
 
The Refugee Convention confers a set of rights that helpfully provide a base on 
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which climate change migration approaches could be built, and sets a possible 
standard formulation for developing a specific document for dealing with the issue. 
However, as mentioned in the discussion of an appropriate definition for climate 
change migrants, ‘refugee’ is a specific tag that is well understood and over time has 
developed clear parameters and appreciation in the international community.  
Modifying the Refugee Convention to broaden its scope is not necessarily a sound 
idea in terms of maintaining the clarity and strength of the concept for refugees. 
Arguably, it is also easier to see the link between life-threatening political or religious 
persecution and the need for migration – a link that is not always so obvious in the 
context of environmental degradation.    
 
Combining refugees and climate change migrants under the umbrella of the same 
set of arrangements or convention could possibly be offensive to the latter, who 
may feel that they are being framed as victims unable to address their situations.  It 
could also be offensive to the former, who are persecuted or fear death and are 
forced to migrate on those grounds.  ‘Refugee’ holds connotations of becoming 
stateless, of cross-border movement, of an urgent need to leave a homeland, usually 
permanently and swiftly – and none of these situations necessarily follow climate 
change related environmental degradation.   Painting potential climate change 
migrants as refugees by including them under an expanded Convention may seem a 
good way of utilizing existing international instruments to deal with new problems, 
but would do them a disservice in narrowing the scope with which the international 
community, and potential host countries and communities, would view their 
situation. The definition of a refugee and associated possibility of using refugee 
status to build a new life could be diluted if the lie of the land changes, not to 
mention the increased pressure of more people funneling through refugee 
processing centres. 
 
Any international framework created or modified to accommodate potential climate 
change migrants should include enough scope and flexibility to enable migrants to 
develop a path of their choosing, should it be necessary to move at some point in 
the future.  While difficult, it would also be best if the framework was also 
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sufficiently flexible to accommodate dynamic patterns of migration and changing 
scientific projections of the effects of climate change.  The future is by and large 
unknown and creating an overly restrictive and rigid framework could potentially 
render it useless for some groups of climate change migrants.  It is possible that an 
inadequate or restrictive framework could send a message that climate change 
migrants are already catered for in the international system and therefore bilateral 
or other arrangements are not necessary, or that they are trying to buck the system 
by going outside the framework.  Establishing a system that duplicates or cuts across 
existing rights frameworks (such as the UNHCR or rights established under existing 
bilateral agreements like New Zealand’s RSE scheme) could be equally damaging.  
This is not to say that the framework must be written with reference to all relevant 
existing domestic policies, but rather that it must retain a degree of flexibility.    
 
Flexibility will also be important to accommodate different types of climate change-
related effects and migration.  For example, those who could be termed ‘water 
migrants’ in a response framework may draw to mind delta or small island-dwellers 
whose land and homes have been inundated, but there are also likely to be drought-
related migrants.  Both situations can be (partly) attributed to the effects of climate 
change, but the circumstances around the cause and effect and movement are very 
different.  The international community is also likely to respond differently to the 
two types, depending on whether one attracts international attention as a crisis 
requiring an emergency humanitarian response.  
 
As most argue, climate change migration will work best when it is part of a planned 
series of adaptation actions, rather than an ultimate last resort outcome (Barnett, 
2003; Burson, 2010).  Much work is underway internationally, regionally and in-
country for bringing adaptation planning and action into the mainstream policy-
making and work of governments.  There is broad agreement that this is an 
important and necessary step, given the extensive overlap between development 
and adaptation – many actions working on the same problem under what are 
potentially separate funding and planning streams, such as water management 
which is climate change-related via rainfall patterns, and health related via quality 
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and supply relative to population (Eastwood, 2009).  
 
Ideally, adaptation actions (such as reducing or preventing rebuilding and new 
building in coastal areas likely to be inundated or flooded) will reduce the need for 
people to move internally and externally.  However, it is clear that at some point 
people will need to move for various reasons, including climate change, and that 
governments have to find a way to adjust their policies to ensure that they can 
accommodate these people.  An international institutional framework will have a 
role to play in that. There is certainly broad assumption that a mechanism at the 
international level is needed (Hodgkinson et al, 2010; Barnett and Webber, 2010; 
Black et al, 2008; Barnett and Adger, 2003). 
 
Summary of gaps  
At present there is no international arrangement operating that oversees climate-
change-related migration internally or externally.  The issue is conveniently being 
dealt with on an ad hoc basis, if movements are defined as being the result of 
climate change migration. Although New Zealand government policymakers 
currently have no mandate from the government (Dunstand and Canham-Harvey, 
2009), New Zealand would want to approach the issue of climate-change-related 
migration with our specific context in mind.   There have been some studies of 
migration flows between the Pacific and New Zealand, but researchers concurred 
that there are difficulties in establishing that climate change is the cause of people’s 
decision to move.  They also identified that with the surge of interest in climate 
change and the Pacific, survey participants were getting less interested in 
participating in studies (Burson, 2010; Barnett, 2001). 
 
In formulating policy a government would need to obtain a clear scope of the scale 
of likely migration, in relation to population growth compared to external migration. 
In the case of the Pacific and New Zealand, for example, Gemenne and Shen’s 
EachFor project in 2009 looked at current migration patterns between Tuvalu and 
New Zealand, and found that contrary to the frequent portrayal, migration is not 
usually about environmental drivers; and importantly (and in common with Barnett), 
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that views on migration within Tuvalu are complicated. “Overall, migration from 
Tuvalu to New Zealand is not as straightforward as it is often presented.  Views on 
the role of climate change in migration in Tuvalu remains [sic] contrasted and 
sometimes conflicting, while the motives of those who emigrated to New Zealand 
were not merely environmental, but included economic and social factors as well” 
(Gemenne and Shen, 2009, p.27).   
 
Burson has obtained the most comprehensive data for Pacific – New Zealand climate 
change-related migration thus far, and the next step would probably be to look at 
New Zealand’s existing policies to see whether there is room for flexibility to 
accommodate urgent migration while longer-term policies are developed (Burson, 
2010).  This is the approach promoted by Bedford, who also indicates that a suite of 
policy options needs to be available (Bedford, 2008).  One component of that suite is 
an international-level discussion, and possibly an institution.  
 
Mechanism justification 
Throughout discussions on climate-change-related migration, including this thesis, 
there is a latent assumption that an institution or mechanism at the international 
level is necessary to deal with possible climate change migration, with all its causes, 
complexities, and forms.  The base of this assumption rests on two premises: first, 
that we must protect the rights of others, which are threatened by climate change, 
and second, that existing rights regimes do not sufficiently deal with climate change 
migration. “There can be little doubt but that climate change-related events and 
processes, in all likelihood, will substantially interfere with the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights by millions of people” (Burson, 2010, p. 162).  But we 
should not leap to conclusions about the necessity for an international instrument as 
the best means for protecting the rights of migrants.   
 
Burson argues that an international instrument alone is not enough to adequately 
address the rights of migrants, and that policy-making and implementation has an 
important role to play in protecting the rights of climate migrants.  “…[C]laims for 
protection will need to be dealt with in the policy sphere, not the international law 
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sphere” (Burson, 2010, p. 172). 
 
Non-existence of a specific regime is not a sufficient reason to create an 
international mechanism.  With climate change as the issue du jour, and one which 
has the potential to affect so many lives so deeply, there is an attempt to assume the 
best way to deal with climate change’s effects is to create institutions.  Policy-
makers at national levels and states at regional and international levels must resist 
this temptation.  The effects of climate change are multitudinous and complex, and 
trying to create institutions to deal with specific aspects of these risks over-
simplifying the problem.  Policy makers should beware of creating institutions for 
every aspect of new problems, as they could make the issue of climate change seem 
fragmented and perhaps not as viable: disparate pieces brought together without 
necessarily having a prior relationship until the advent of climate change.    
 
While international mechanisms for the protection of human rights exist and are 
well-known, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights reported that the 
current protections under international law do not adequately provide for some of 
the categories of people likely to be displaced by climate change (OHCHR, 2009, p. 
19).  However, this is not to say that the rights of climate change migrants dissipate 
as soon as they make a move.  “That there are gaps in the existing protection 
regimes does not mean those displaced or migrating are devoid of any rights 
protection … under general multilateral human rights treaties such as the 1966 
ICCPR and 1966 Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, states already 
have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the rights contained therein of people 
within their jurisdiction.  That these people migrate or are displaced by climate 
change to within the state’s jurisdiction does not divest them of the rights they 
enjoy” (Burson, 2010, p. 169). 
 
General consensus among practitioners working on the issue of climate change 
migration is that the Refugee Convention is inappropriate as a specific protection for 
climate change migrants (Hodgkinson, Barnett, Burson).  These practitioners 
consider that, while not ideally suited, the UNFCCC is the obvious existing instrument 
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dealing with climate change and all its aspects.  They suggest that devolving 
migration and other adaptation actions from it could weaken the UNFCCC by making 
it seem that it is not an appropriate home for issues not directly related to weather 
and climate, whereas all related issues should be tied to the organisation.   
There is no doubt that there is a strong potential for climate change-related 
migration that needs to be considered, and in turn the need for an effective 
response also must be considered.  However to fully and productively justify the 
creation of a mechanism to deal with climate change-related migrants, we must be 
very clear how these people are different from those in a situation also not of their 
causing but a consequence of human activity.  We risk creating a precedent that 
could undermine the importance of what is to be addressed.     
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Section D 
 
The proposed ‘Convention for Persons 
Displaced by Climate Change’ as a 
possible solution to identified gaps   
The proposal for filling the perceived gap is described and analysed, with a view to 
assessing whether it addresses the points raised in Sections B and C.  This section 
considers whether a proposed convention makes a valuable contribution to the 
debate and potential approaches.  It argues that these authors also presume a gap 
that needs filling by a mechanism, and set out to create a practical framework for 
managing potential climate change related migration.  It argues that the 
Convention’s predominant value lies in its creation of a practical organisational 
structure.  
 
The section identifies various aspects of the proposed Convention which could be 
modified to better address the potential problem, taking into account issues 
examined the preceding sections.  The thesis argues that the Convention adopts a 
simplistic approach to supposed ‘responsibility’ for climate change and the 
associated duty on those deemed responsible to financially mitigate its impacts and 
address effects such as migration.  This section argues that the Convention may be 
theoretically sound, but if it is to have a useful and practical applicability it must be 
politically feasible.  In its current formulation aspects such as definitions and funding 
apportionment are very likely to make it unpalatable to the international community 
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of states.  The requirements for immediate funding and practical assistance are 
limitations. 
While the singling out of small island states or a specific section is laudable in 
relation to the political weight, in the wider context the current section as written 
would be more appropriate for a regional rather than international mechanism.  The 
Convention establishes a useful set of principles for which there may be broader 
application as approaches to the problem continue to be considered. 
The proposed Convention 
 
A group of academics working on climate change-related legal matters in Australia 
have undertaken a considerable amount of work on issues around the possible legal 
consequences of climate change, and their latest project was to draft a proposed 
Convention for dealing with the possibility of climate change-related migration.  
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s proposal is called “The Hour When The 
Ship Comes In: A Convention For Persons Displaced By Climate Change”, and will 
hereafter be referred to as ‘the proposed Convention’.   
 
The possible problem of climate change-related migration has the potential to 
involve a vast number of individuals and states across the world, depending on the 
severity of the effects of climate change and the actions people take to deal with 
those effects.  In that sense, it is not necessarily fair to require the authors of any 
proposals for dealing with the potential problem to hold any particular credentials or 
background – if they are to be affected, why should they not comment?  However 
for the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to know a little about the authors of the 
proposed Convention, and their motivations for drafting it.  
 
All four authors have a background in environment and legal matters, and are based 
in Australia.  David Hodgkinson is a Special Counsel at Australian law firm Clayton 
Utz, an associate professor at the University of Western Australia Law School, a 
member of climate change and aviation advisors ‘The Hodgkinson Group’, and is 
Executive Director of Australian-based EcoCarbon (an industry partnership building 
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capacity in market-based mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions  
(www.ecocarbon.org.au). Hodgkinson appears to have led the project and its limited 
promotion to date, supported by Tess Burton, Heather Anderson and Lucy Young.  
Tess Burton is a chapter author of Hodgkinson’s publication Climate Change Law and 
Policy in Australia, and a research officer at the Victorian Parliament. Heather 
Anderson has worked on native land right issues in Western Australia and Victoria 
states, and is a law and arts student at the University of Western Australia. Lucy 
Young is the convenor for the Western Australia Environment Action Network, and is 
a solicitor with Western Australia Legal Aid.  The four authors will hereafter be 
referred to as ‘Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’.  
 
That the authors are all based in Australia, with its proximity to and strong 
relationships with the Pacific states, could account for the focus on small island 
states in the proposed Convention. Conspicuously absent however, are references to 
New Zealand, which is also highly likely to be a significant player in any climate 
change-related migration in the Pacific region (through political and historical 
relationships, existing migrant communities, as donor or host).   
 
Through their work on the proposed Convention, Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and 
Young identify a gap in the existing human rights protection mechanisms, which 
would disadvantage potential climate change-related migrants.  They suggest that 
the existence of the gap in itself is justification enough for creating a filler.  They 
extrapolate this as an opportunity to take their existing academic and publicising 
work further, creating a framework for the practical management of potential 
climate change-related migration.  They hope that the framework will be adopted by 
the international community of states managing the migration process and envisage 
that it would ensure that the human rights (as understood in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) of climate change-related migrants would be 
comprehensively protected.   
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s stated purpose is that the proposed 
Convention “…provides a general framework for the provision of assistance to 
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climate change displaced persons3 [sic] [CCDPs] (regardless of the nature of their 
displacement), … address[es] gaps in existing protections by setting out a framework 
for the protection of those persons displaced across international borders, as well as 
identif[ies] principles which should apply to the resettlement of persons from small 
island states” (Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010). Their starting points 
are recognitions that a lack of coordination among governments creates a gap, and 
that pre-emptive organisation of migration is the best approach to avoid 
“inconsistency, confusion and conflict”.  (Ibid, p.3)  Finding that current international 
law protections and climate change-related agreements (primarily the UNFCCC) do 
not cover climate change migrants, the proposed Convention aims to “…address 
gaps in the international regime of human rights protections and humanitarian 
assistance as it currently applies to CCDPs” (Ibid, p. 9). The authors describe their 
Convention as the “…most effective way of resolving this problem” (Hodgkinson, 
Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010, p.3). 
 
Set firmly on a base of state-centrism and existing mechanisms, the proposed 
Convention intends to provide a framework for protecting the rights of and a 
mechanism for providing assistance to climate change-related migrants and their 
hosts, and to establish a set of principles to guide the management of movement of 
people from SIS.  SIS are prioritised under the Convention, on the basis of severity of 
climate change effects on their environments, the short timeframe for addressing 
the effects of climate change, and despite this small proportion SIS inhabitants of 
likely climate change-related migrants worldwide.  The Convention sets principles for 
application to bilateral agreements, which are to be negotiated under the aegis of 
one of the Convention’s implementing bodies – the (Climate Change Displacement 
Organisation (CCDO).  The Convention provides only for movement from developing 
to developed countries.  The implicit assumption seems to be that developed                                                         
3 For clarity, I will retain Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s usage of ‘persons’ although it is 
never made clear what, if any, distinction is drawn between ‘persons’ and ‘people’ that resulted in 
the latter being ruled out for use throughout the Convention.  This may seem to be grammatical 
quibbling, but the proposed Convention refers to the migration of groups en mass – presumably 
‘people’ in the sense of a community, whereas ‘persons’ is likely to be colloquially understood as 
connoting individuals.  The issue here is whether the authors intend us as readers to understand the 
subjects of the Convention as individuals or groups (e.g. communities), in the context of climate 
change-related migration.   
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countries and their citizens are able to take care of their own who may become 
climate change-related migrants without needing recourse to an international 
mechanism.  
 
Part of the value, and certainly the uniqueness of this proposal, lies in its creation of 
a detailed organisational structure to implement the proposed Convention.  As the 
authors point out, other proposals describe the administration but do not detail the 
operational arms of an instrument.  Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s 
Convention has the following governance structure.  It is headed by a Climate 
Change Displacement Organisation (CCDO), which comprises four bodies, and its 
functions are demonstrated in the diagram below.  The bodies are an Assembly 
Council (the governing body of the CCDO), Climate Change Displacement Fund 
(CCDF), Climate Change Displacement Environment and Science Organisation 
(CCDESO), and Climate Change Displacement Implementation Groups.   
 
 
 
 
Broadly, the four proposed implementing bodies of the CCDO exist to provide advice 
and information to the CCDO Council for decisions, and implement the decisions 
when taken.  The relationship and hierarchy between the proposed Assembly and 
CCDO 
ASSEMBLY 
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CCDO Council is unclear. The Assembly would ratify financial contributions to the 
CCDF (following advice from the CCDF and CCDESO), and review the state of climate 
change science with a particular focus on implications for displacement. The 
proposed Assembly Council nominally sits below the CCDO Council, but as the 
former is comprised of state Party representatives it would probably overrule the 
CCDO Council in practice.  In the UNFCCC, there are frequent restatements of the 
fact that the negotiations are a ‘party driven process’, meaning that state 
representatives hold the reins of progress and decision-making.  
 
A CCDO Council is mentioned throughout the proposed Convention, but it is unclear 
exactly where this would sit in the hierarchy.  Its functions are to assess requests for 
assistance and en masse designations of ‘climate change displaced persons’, and to 
set the direction and guide operations of the CCDO.  The CCDF proposes the level of 
developed state contributions to the fund, and the level of assistance to developing 
state parties and CCDIGs.  Following the CCDO Council decision on funding, the CCDF 
would work to disburse funds through state parties and the CCDIGs.  Funding 
procedures are a crucial aspect of the proposed Convention, both politically and 
practically.  The considerable implications of these proposed arrangements are 
discussed in more detail in the following section.   
 
The CCDESO is designed to investigate issues of causality raised in the thesis sections 
above, in relation to whether the effects of climate change or human activity can be 
said to have wholly or partly caused a particular situation that requires people to 
migrate.    The CCDESO will advise the CCDO on climate change science issues 
(particularly around slow onset and sudden events), and advise the CCDF on 
appropriate levels of funding assistance to developing state parties and CCDIGs.  It 
would also monitor state parties’ emissions levels to assist in determining their 
financial contributions to the Fund, which are based on measured emissions.   The 
CCDESO would also conduct research and establish links with the IPCC, the UNFCCC’s 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice, and other organisations.   
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The CCDIGs will effect resettlement, the CCDIG would be led by a representative of 
the CCDO.  Depending whether migration is internal or external, membership would 
comprise some or all representatives of the following: home and host states, local 
and/or state governments, international organisations and relevant UN bodies 
(unspecified and somewhat mystifying in this context).  The CCDIGs would also work 
with civil society at both ends of the migration process, and with Regional 
Committees.   
 
The authors provide very little information on Regional Committees, other than 
references to their virtues.  In practical terms, it seems they would be established to 
“…inform Council and CCDO decision-making of regional perspectives, views and 
developments; … work closely with CCDIGs, and enable the unique situation of small 
island states to be addressed” (Ibid, p. 26).  However, it is unclear whether the 
‘regions’ would reflect geography or interest.  For example, an Asia-Pacific ‘region’ 
grouping would probably reflect a very different set of perspectives and views than a 
Small Island States grouping.  It is naïve to assume that all states’ interests are 
equally represented in regional groupings, not least as some states in a region can 
neither afford to send a representative to meetings nor have the capacity to develop 
a specialist in a particular area.   
 
In addition to these practical implementation bodies, there are mentions of an 
administrative arrangement tied through the entire structure, including a permanent 
secretariat.  As this thesis is focused on the larger issues of the contribution the 
proposed Convention may or may not make to the approach to the potential 
problem of climate change-related migration, the specifics of the administrative 
arrangements will not be dealt with in detail.  However, from the limited information 
the authors have provided about the arrangements, it is interesting that they have 
not addressed a consistent criticism of international and United Nations 
organisations, namely that the administrative support consumes a disproportionate 
amount of the organisation’s entire budget and functionality.   
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While the available descriptions of the proposed Convention have some interesting 
gaps, the authors have established a clear and interesting framework, which enables 
assessment of its potential contributions to the problem of responding to the 
potential for climate change-related migration.   
 
Assessment of the proposed Convention 
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s proposed Convention makes practical 
and theoretical progress towards addressing gaps in human rights protections and 
mechanisms for managing potential climate change-related migration.  However, the 
authors are not convincing on the crucial aspect of the link between the theoretical 
justification for needing to develop a response to the potential problem, and that a 
Convention is the best way to respond.  The design of the framework usefully 
examines how a response could work in practice, but some aspects of the design 
create political barriers to the proposed Convention’s acceptance by states.  A more 
strongly developed theoretical basis and justification could lead the authors towards 
a more acceptable practical design, or at least direct them to areas from which to 
create a framework.  In general, further work is needed by both these authors and 
others, and by states and international organisations, to address the political issues 
of the nexus between recognition of the problem in relation and the requirement for 
a response.   
 
 Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young assume that there will be climate change-
related migrants, that the problem is near to hand, and that it will be significant.  All 
of these assumptions are sound in themselves, as shown in Section A.  However, it is 
a fairly obvious political reality that the international community of states must be 
convinced of the specific problem and that there is no current system which can 
manage it, before states are willing to part with funds - not to mention the land, 
resources, time, and potential political capital, among other things, associated with 
assistance to migrants.   
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As discussed above we cannot find justification for a new system of management, 
funding, and human rights norms in simply identifying that there are likely to be 
people whose categorisation (in this case, ‘climate change-related migrants’) is not 
already sufficiently covered by international and domestic systems of support. 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young surprisingly did not mention a need for 
international coordination among governments within the frame of what currently 
exists, i.e. a United Nations-negotiated agreement, despite referring to this as part of 
the problem they were trying to solve.  
 
This intervention logic question is, arguably, the most significant issue which the 
authors of the proposed Convention face.  The stated justification is that, “there has 
been no coordinated response by governments to address human displacement, 
whether domestic or international, temporary or permanent, due to climate 
change”. The authors go on to suggest that because climate change is global and 
people played a role in contributing to it, the international community must accept 
responsibility for managing the ensuing problem (Ibid, p. 3).  At face value, this is all 
very sensible.  
 
However as discussed in Sections A and B, it is spurious to overlook migration causes 
other than those effects which are directly attributable to climate change by using 
‘displacement’ and suggesting that movement may be attributable to one factor 
only.  The authors’ stated justification simplifies the issue too far, and too thinly, 
essentially suggesting that because people move because of the actions of people, 
everyone must mitigate the effects of moving.  But this gives us no clues as to 
precisely what is lacking at present and whether it is a problem we must address 
now, or why a Convention is the best solution to this.  
 
The second part of the author’s justification points closer to what seems to lie at the 
heart of their (unwritten) justification.  This is because when a problem is fluid and 
widespread but cloaked under a range of long-standing challenges (such as extreme 
weather), our responses are typically disparate and uncoordinated. This, too, is 
undeniable, and at present as discussed in Section B there is in fact no coordinated 
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response to the salient problem at the international level.  But once again, the link 
between this lack of coordination and the need for a coordinated response is not 
made in the proposed Convention.  Tellingly, the authors mention the need to 
address climate change-related migration depending on the local situation and the 
people’s wishes, and this could be construed as an argument for an uncoordinated 
response, rather than a coordinated one.  
 
Elsewhere in the paper is the assertion that “…ad hoc measures based on existing 
domestic regimes are likely to lead to inconsistency, confusion and conflict” 
(Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010, p.13).  This bold statement is 
somewhat isolated, in that there is no supporting evidence or discussion surrounding 
it.  Barnett, Burson and Bedford all make reference to the importance of bilateral 
discussions and arrangements between neighbouring countries or those with an 
existing relationship in addressing climate change migration.  Furthermore, despite 
this and another comment in the Convention to the effect that uncoordinated 
climate change migration will cause conflict, this link has largely been discredited in 
the last couple of years. As with migration, ascertaining that climate change is the 
cause of conflict is tenuous, particularly as much of the evidence now points to 
economic factors and poor governance being the more significant drivers of conflict. 
Interestingly, these are also the factors that cause the effects of climate change to 
be more significant in countries most likely to be the origin of climate change 
migrants (Barnett, 2001; Carius and Maas, n.d.).   
 
However, they acknowledge and draw out the important consideration that even 
while the current situations of climate change-related migration (if specific cases 
could be readily identified) are currently local and largely do not trouble the 
international community en masse, the scope of the problem and the requirement 
for a wider response grows as the effects of climate change have a greater negative 
impact on peoples’ lives.  The authors’ contribution is in the forward-looking 
assumptions they make about the state of the problem in the future, and the 
acknowledgement that political developments with practical outcomes such as their 
proposal move slowly and need to be developed over a long period of time.  This 
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proposed Convention is not designed for use tomorrow, but to deal with a problem 
as it exist in the future, on a more difficult scale and scope than its current state.   
 
Acknowledging a gap in the existing international human rights protection 
frameworks enabled Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young to create a 
mechanism for practically managing large-scale movement of people between 
countries and within countries, under the oversight of the international community 
of states.  Most importantly perhaps, the practical detail it is accorded in the 
proposed Convention provides a framework for funding the movement of people.  
This puts climate change-related migration in an exalted position in relation to other 
types of migration.  
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s stated aim is to provide a 
“…comprehensive, global solution” (Ibid, p.12) and their research into the issue and 
on other proposals identified aspects that must therefore be included in a 
Convention.  They reached the following conclusions, on which the proposed 
Convention is based.  First, the Convention must include both types of migration 
likely to result from the effects of climate change – internal and cross-border.  
Second, an adequate and specific definition must be established to appropriately 
frame the subjects of the Convention.  Third, ensuring the appropriateness of the 
instrument and its effectiveness for those who would use it requires taking into 
account the wide range of circumstances from which climate change migrants could 
emerge.  For example, the needs of people from small island states will be very 
different from those of people from a delta region in a large state.   
 
(Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young have made specific provisions for 
inhabitants of small island states in their Convention.  This renders the Convention of 
particular interest for New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours.)  Fourth, this 
Convention also establishes principles for application to bilateral agreements 
between small island states and host states.  Finally, the Convention works through a 
level of detail (establishing a governance structure) that is not present in other 
 65 
Conventions and a useful point of reference when considering the likely practical use 
of the Convention, and its likely acceptance by states.   
 
Weak points of proposal 
As discussed above, while the Refugee Convention could in theory be modified to 
accommodate climate change, Burson recommends proceeding with caution before 
opening up “…the most successful international protection instrument currently 
existing in international law” (Burson, 2010, p. 161).  However, that very success 
means that using the Refugee Convention as a source of facets and principles for this 
Convention is a wise move for Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young.  Burson 
also notes that because gaps exist does not mean that climate change migrants are 
devoid of any rights protection at all.  They are covered under existing multilateral 
treaties, such as the 1966 ICCPR and 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Burson, 2010, p. 169). 
 
 
Responsibility and funding 
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s framework equates responsibility with 
response, in that the authors have identified a responsible ‘owner’ of the problem of 
climate change-related migration, and created a system which draws from those 
responsible to create a tangible response in the form of financial assistance to 
migrants and hosts.  We presume that financial assistance also flows from developed 
countries to the system itself, the secretariat and functions of the system, as well as 
provide assistance to migrants – but it seems safe to draw this conclusion on the 
basis of other international and UN organisations.  The underlying assertion suggests 
that climate change is considered anthropogenic, and developed states considered 
those that caused and continue to cause it, and therefore developed states should 
bear the costs of dealing with the direct and indirect effects of climate change 
including migration.   
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The primary issue with linking the response to responsibility in this case is, as 
discussed in Section A, that it is not a direct and linear link between anthropogenic 
climate change and migration.  Furthermore, identifying developed states as the 
responsible parties is not untrue or unfair, but the picture is more complex than the 
authors’ simple phrasing and system suggests, and will only get more rather than 
less complex as the patterns of emission and mitigation develop in the future.  
 
The proposed Convention directly links funding ratios to reported emissions. The 
CCDESO’s monitoring of emissions is a duplication of the UNFCCC’s established role 
in monitoring emissions. It would seem more transparent and a better use of 
(presumably limited) resources to use existing reputable UNFCCC information, with 
its good historical record in this complex area, rather than creating another duplicate 
set in this context.  The UNFCCC systems have also dealt with the complexities of 
how a state measures its emissions, particularly historical emissions.   
 
The system of financial contributions under the proposed Convention would be 
based on the level of emissions, and the authors suggest that the 
developed/developing split across states will play out neatly in the financial system, 
with developed states putting money in and developing states taking money out.   
However, the authors have not mentioned what metric they are using to determine 
which are developed and which are developing states.   
 
This is important, as mentioned above, because for example China and Brazil – both 
are probably considered ‘developing’ states by the authors – yet are emitting well 
above many developed countries in the amount of their emissions.  The respective 
emissions profiles of the ‘BRIC’ countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) are projected 
to rise over the coming decades, while countries such as the US and many of those in 
Western Europe have a slower rise, or in some cases a fall in projected emissions. 
States also have a tendency to see it as their sovereign right to decide how much 
money they wish to allocate to a particular mechanism, rather than having it decided 
for them.   
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If the authors wish the proposed Convention to be adopted by the international 
community and a response developed, the political aspects of their proposal, such as 
this, will need a far greater degree of scrutiny and management to be acceptable.  As 
it is, developed countries would be unwilling to spend yet more money in a time of 
international financial crisis and hardship to fund an arrangement that duplicates 
functions and does not have what would be seen as a ‘fair’ system for deciding 
appropriate contributions.  
 
 
In looking at the specifics of what would be funded, Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson 
and Young’s proposed Convention is intended to primarily address “…slow-onset, 
gradual displacement, which is more likely to be able to be established as induced by 
anthropogenic climate change than a sudden disaster” (Hodgkinson, Burton, 
Anderson and Young, 2010).  In line with academic consensus on the subject, 
displacement is viewed as a form of adaptation, and the Convention includes 
consideration of provision for pre-emptive resettlement.  It also explicitly covers 
both internal and cross-border migration, noting that the former is most likely given 
cost and socio-economic factors involved in decision-making on migration.   
 
The Convention recognises and respects the existing distinction between these two 
forms of migration, and acknowledges the primacy of the state and non-
intervention.  It does this by ensuring that “…assistance and protection obligations 
generally go no further than existing instruments; the Convention would operate 
within the present international law distinction between internal and international 
displacement, and those moving across state borders would be entitled to rights 
based on the Refugee Convention” (Ibid, p. 17).  The Convention also recognises that 
“…national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide 
protection and humanitarian assistance to CCDPs within their jurisdiction” (Ibid).   
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Hodgkinson et al. give a two-fold intervention rationale for their Convention: 
historical responsibility and gaps in rights protection regimes.  Historical 
responsibility does not really lead to the need for a Convention in particular. 
Historical responsibility argues that emitters are responsible for securing the future 
of those countries worst affected by climate change, but it does not necessarily 
follow that an international instrument such as this Convention is the only way to 
secure that future.  Arguing that the primary focus of the international community 
should be the prevention of de jure and de facto statelessness, Burson suggests that 
possible policy settings are formal ceding of sovereignty to a host state so that 
government exists in a different territory, adjustments in nationality laws of the host 
state to allow dual citizenship during transit periods, or adjustments to existing 
policy around naturalisation requirements (Burson, 2010, pp. 168-9).  These would 
all assist to secure peoples’ future, but none require an international Convention.  
 
Two aspects underlying the proposed Convention’s funding system raise further 
theoretical issues that are occupying other fora, and yet to be resolved.  The section 
proposes that developed state parties make mandatory contributions to the Climate 
Change Displacement Fund, “…on the basis that states and state parties to the 
Convention have common but differentiated responsibilities;” (Hodgkinson, Burton, 
Anderson and Young, 2010, p.29).  The mandatory nature of the contribution is 
somewhat contradictory to the assertions and proposal features elsewhere in the 
document that retain state primacy.  Furthermore, the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ is contentious in this formulation.  
 
Taken from the UNFCCC (although Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young do not 
reference that document), the full phrase is, importantly, ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (emphasis added).  The 
second part of the principle puts in a brief (but unacknowledged or explained) 
appearance on the following page, but is otherwise absent.  The principle 
acknowledges that all countries have a responsibility to tackle climate change, but 
that states’ responsibility for the current state of the environment is different – 
some emitted more greenhouse gases and therefore bear a larger burden of 
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responsibility. The second part of the principle, ‘respective capabilities’ is crucial as it 
refers to states’ ability, both economic and human, to address the effects of climate 
change both domestically and internationally.   
 
Omitting the second part of the principle has consequences for the functions of the 
Convention. Hodgkinson et al. noted that the principle has “…a number of 
implications, including the imposition of environmental obligations which differ 
between states” (Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010, p. 30).  One of 
these, alluded to but not noted by the authors, is that the second part of the 
principle could be used to encourage developing countries with sufficient resources 
to contribute to the CCDF, thereby increasing the pool of available funding to 
support those with little responsibility and little resource.  The authors note that the 
use of this principle to apportion funding requirements is used by a number of other 
proposals to address climate change migration, including those proposals which 
Hodgkinson et al. drew on to construct their own – Biermann and Boas (2007), and 
Docherty and Giannini (2009).   While this principle is popular in academic proposals, 
it could encounter resistance from potential state parties unwilling to commit to 
modalities of a funding mechanism before negotiation.   
 
The proposal elaborates the modalities of the funding mechanism, suggesting that to 
determine how much each state party must pay: “…the CCDESO would advise the 
Fund with regard to those contributions, with reference to emissions levels (whether 
historical or current, per capita etc)” (Ibid, p. 29).  While it is useful to have a level of 
detail that is absent from other proposals, the measure (and process) for assessing 
appropriate contributions is one of the issues that states will want to negotiate in 
detail, given the potentially significant consequences for their fiscal health.  There 
would also be much negotiation around who sits on the CCDESO and Fund boards, 
given their significant decision-making power on contributions and other financial 
matters.  Also of interest to many states may be the administrative cost associated 
with setting up the institutions of the Convention, particularly in relation to the 
amount of money they need to contribute.  
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Political and practical feasibility 
 
While it is useful to have such detail laid out in the Convention proposal, states are 
unlikely to show interest in it for taking up to the negotiation stage unless all issues 
are up for negotiation, including the funding modalities and organisational structure.  
The authors could also consider whether there would be an expectation that the 
money is ‘new’, or whether a state could direct part of its annual aid budget to the 
Convention’s mechanism.  To be realistically attractive to states, funding needs to be 
politically palatable with domestic constituencies, and at the time of writing many 
states will find themselves faced with a population less interested in funding issues 
that are not necessarily immediate and vital, when confronted with natural disasters 
and economic crises.   
 
Another aspect of the justification for the proposed Convention, gaps in rights 
protection regimes, is somewhat stronger than that of responsibility equating to 
response, but again does not necessarily point to a Convention as the necessary 
form for a response.  The proposed Convention points to areas where there could 
potentially be gaps in human rights protections for climate change-related migrants, 
but the reader is left with an impression that the suggestion that there may be gaps 
is justification enough for creating another regime to protect people.  It seems that 
the negative effects of climate change themselves constitute an assault on a 
person’s human rights, and other contributing factors (such as human activity or 
neglect) are swept aside.  
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young have defined climate change displaced 
persons as “…groups of people whose habitual homes have become – or will, on the 
balance of probabilities, become – temporarily or permanently uninhabitable as a 
consequence of a climate change event”.  While long, the definition covers a few of 
the more problematic aspects of defining people who move in relation to the effects 
of climate change.  It considers the fragility of prediction and timing, and the use of 
‘uninhabitable’ and ‘homes’ is broad enough that a range of context-specific 
circumstances could be captured.  Presumably the modalities around a person’s 
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circumstances meeting the criteria based on the definition would be worked out 
through the process of negotiation and setting the parameters of the implementing 
bodies.  The use of ‘on the balance of probabilities’ also gives the space required to 
include pre-emptive migration – it is entirely possible that a person’s home may be 
expected to be uninhabitable but the day never actually arrives, and in the 
meantime they have made a decision to move on the basis that they do not wish to 
await the final destruction.  It also ensures that those who have the foresight and 
means to migrate before the worst struck would still, theoretically, be covered by 
the Convention.   
 
The authors also define a ‘climate change event’ as “…sudden or gradual 
environmental disruption that is consistent with climate change and to which 
humans very likely contributed” (Ibid, p.10).  This captures both extreme events and 
slow-onset events like sea level rise and changes to rainfall patterns.  
 
Spectrum of actions and migration types 
 
Noting the now wide acceptance that climate change-related migration exists along 
a continuum between forced at one end to voluntary at the other, Burson suggests 
that the considerable grey area in between is potentially problematic in terms of 
issues of extremity.  How dry must a village be for its inhabitants to count as ‘forced’ 
migrants, or how far underwater? Must the water or the drought be solely an effect 
of climate change?  
 
For the Pacific context in particular, an ideal definition would acknowledge and 
clarify the relationship between the effects of these two types of human activity 
(direct and indirect). As Bedford explains, the population-environment problems 
confronting residents in parts of Kiribati and Tuvalu are not new, but are 
compounded by increasing concentrations of population in particular urban areas, 
and intensifying pollution of the main sources of freshwater which sustains the 
islands’ life (Bedford, 2008, p. 124). Both direct and indirect human activity have 
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effects on the islands’ environments, so need to be addressed, and it is likely that 
the response would include similar if not the same actions.   
 
Adaptive responses to declining water quality and quantity are unlikely to differ on 
the basis of cause, and responses should avoid directing funding streams on the 
basis of cause.  That said, issues of responsibility for environmental degradation 
become more important when there are large sums of money or the movement of 
many people involved.  Causality aside, now that the effects of both direct and 
indirect human activity have merged to create a serious problem for the islands 
there is understandably an inclination to follow the money to the potentially fastest 
and most significant funding source. Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young do 
not really address this issue, although it could have a significant impact on the 
success of the Convention.   
 
Principles 
 
Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young envisage a governance structure for the 
Convention with “…a role for regional committees and multi-disciplinary 
collaborations across developed and developing states, and including government 
and non-government organisations” (Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 
2010, p. 24).  The structure bears some similarity to that of the UNFCCC, but would 
in all likelihood be changed by states during the negotiation process. While the 
structure may seem straightforward, the functions of some arms duplicate those 
already in existence, and given that new organisations require a significant amount 
of money to establish and resource, states may prefer to utilise existing 
organisations by adding specialist units within the existing structure.   
 
For example, the Climate Change Displacement Environment and Science 
Organisation duplicates some functions of the UNFCCC, such as monitoring of state 
emissions.  Its unique functions relate to the decisions around both incoming and 
outgoing funding, and “climate change and displacement research” is already 
undertaken by the IPCC, IOM, and many other organisations.  Adding another seems 
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superfluous, and in addition requirements for reporting could place an unnecessarily 
onerous burden on states with few resources to manage scientific reporting.  There 
is no reference in the Convention to financial assistance to states (developed or 
developing) for compiling emissions information, and if the CCDESO is to establish 
links with the IPCC and UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice, presumably it could share information with those bodies.   
 
The functions of the Climate Change Displacement Fund include working with 
recipients and Implementation Groups on the deployment of funds to support 
people during their moves.  This is a relatively operational-level exercise, and it 
seems that the CCDF would need to be staffed by a wide range of people with a 
range of expertise – from financial management specialists who can transfer 
emissions levels to funding contributions, to those who have operational knowledge 
of migration and adaptation actions to work on fund deployment.  That the authors 
evidently want to ensure that funding gets to where it is needed (this is presumably 
the intention of such a range of functions, the rationale not actually being 
elaborated in the text). However, such activity is undeniably costly, especially in 
combination with appropriate staffing of other institutions and the Convention’s 
secretariat.   
 
While the authors have drawn on existing mechanisms such as the UNFCCC to design 
the Convention’s structure, they have also based the principles laid over the 
structure on existing mechanisms.  This adoption would stand the Convention in 
good stead for consideration by states, as they would already be largely comfortable 
with the principles therein.  One aspect that does not get included is soft law.  While 
the Convention refers to the Refugee Convention and UNFCCC, there is no reference 
to soft law.  Burson suggests that institutions should draw on soft law instruments, 
such as the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 2005 Pinheiro 
Principles on housing and shelter, and the Hyogo Framework of Action on Disaster 
Preparedness.  For the Pacific, this is an important point as the region has developed 
a number of strategies for responding to the negative effects of climate change.  
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Bedford suggests that New Zealand and Australia should make creative use of 
existing immigration policies to manage climate change-related migration from the 
Pacific, and refers specifically to the New Zealand Pacific Access Category (Bedford, 
2008, p. 94).  He also recommends regional collaboration in strategy development 
and progressive reductions in population size in particularly vulnerable Pacific 
countries to gradually manage migration.  In relation to Kiribati and Tuvalu, Bedford 
raises the “…possibility of New Zealand moving towards a pro-active policy with 
regard to relocation of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans and anticipation of a need for more 
resettlement options for atoll dwellers in the future” (Ibid, pp. 94-5). 
 
The Convention views climate change-related migration as an adaptive response to 
climate change and specifically includes provisions for pre-emptive movement of 
people before their homes become uninhabitable.  However, Hodgkinson, Burton, 
Anderson and Young propose en masse designations of the status of ‘climate change 
displaced persons’, through a process of request and determination by states and 
Convention institutions (Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010, p.9).  
However, it is not clear whether the en masse designation would apply to a 
community, village, individual and identified others, or to the entire state 
population.  
 
Bedford advocates for gradual movement of people rather than en masse, as 
adjustments to New Zealand’s policy settings “…would not obviate the need for 
continued investment in improving living conditions and economic opportunities in 
the [Pacific] islands…[voluntary migration would] complement existing aid 
programmes” (Bedford, 2008, p. 96).  Immigration policies would be developed for 
long-term problem resolution, and aid policies for short- to medium-term 
improvement in living conditions.   
 
The inclusion of pre-emptive movement in Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and 
Young’s proposed Convention does indicate a good understanding of the issues 
facing small island states, where staying to the last is not necessarily an option.  
However, the Convention makes no reference to Burson’s suggestion of dovetailing 
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migration policies with aid support to ensure suitable conditions for those who 
remain on the islands.  This is a crucial point as research has found that some older 
Pacific Islanders would prefer to stay in their homes, or at least on their atolls and in 
their countries, rather than migrating – regardless of the consequences (Bedford, 
2008; Gemenne and Shen, 2008). 
 
Small island states are allocated a section of the Convention, in relation to the slow-
onset nature of their plight and high vulnerability to the effects of climate change 
(Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young, 2010, pp. 41-45).  This section sets out 
principles that the authors think should be applicable to bilateral climate change-
related migration agreements, and suggests that such agreements should be 
negotiated under the aegis of the CCDO and regional committees.  The principles are 
proximity, self-determination, and preservation of intangible culture.   
 
The principle of proximity would guide agreements between states with the aim of 
the least separation of people from their home, referred to in the Convention as 
their “cultural area”.  The self-determination principle draws on the UNICESCR to 
ensure that people decide when they leave their homes, and where they choose to 
go.  It also underpins that people should be able to stay on their island as long as 
practicable – as Bedford suggested.  Adaptation funding would also be provided 
through the Convention’s fund to assist with this aim – although this function will 
also be carried out by the UNFCCC Green Fund, and is also managed through 
bilateral aid programmes.  Ensuring that these functions complement one another 
and do not duplicate would be important, and relatively difficult.  It seems that a 
preferable approach would be for the UNFCCC Green Fund to provide adaptation 
support in conjunction with bilateral aid programmes, and the Convention’s fund 
restrict its activities to providing funding to support the migration process itself.   
 
The third principle, preservation of intangible culture, draws on the en masse 
designation system to enable communities or other groups to “formulate solutions 
that would keep the integrity of a group intact, which could help preserve cultures 
and national identities” (Ibid, p. 44).  Here again the essential principle has been 
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adopted from the Refugee Convention, and it should be remembered that (as 
Burson pointed out) migrants are not devoid of rights in relation to the preservation 
of their cultural identity. Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young draw on the 
‘Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage’ as well, for 
further protection of the culture of small island state inhabitants.  These three 
principles are useful for application to bilateral agreements, but it seems that it is 
only if bilateral agreements are negotiated under the Convention that they can be 
brought to bear on the negotiation outcome, unless states decide to unilaterally 
draw the principles to the process operating outside the Convention.   
 
SIS in the Pacific have indicated that they are in need of assistance immediately, not 
at some point in the future, and the assistance is needed to deal with internal and 
cross-border migration, and to address the wider range of climate change effects to 
which their countries and communities must adapt. It seems that the principles laid 
out here do not specifically relate to small island states, as adaptation funding and 
protection of cultural rights should be extended to all climate change-related 
migrant communities.   
 
Proximity is the only principle that bears more relevance for the Pacific, but the 
suggestion in the Convention is that this would translate into a movement to 
Australia or the United States. The logical conclusion one would draw from the 
principle is that it would translate into south-south cooperation, as Pacific people 
may want to move to other Pacific countries.  Indeed, research conducted on drivers 
of migration ascertained that people may want to move to a similar lifestyle and 
society, in which case they indicated a move to another Pacific community or 
elsewhere in their own country; or a relatively similar lifestyle and community where 
others from their country or community already lives in which case they indicated a 
move to New Zealand or Australia.  As all the authors are Australian and the 
Convention documents make reference to Kiribati and Tuvalu, this seems an unusual 
oversight, unless intra-Pacific movement is considered to be ‘internal’.  Regrettably, 
the Convention is silent on this point.   
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In drafting the proposed Convention Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young have 
drawn on existing legal instruments and international mechanisms to create a 
Convention that could form a very useful basis for negotiation by states.  Despite 
some issues with concepts being underdeveloped (and functionality being somewhat 
overdeveloped for political purposes), the basic premise of the Convention is strong.  
That said, states such as New Zealand are likely to have qualms about the funding 
modalities and the creation of new institutions where existing ones already carry out 
the same functions. The design and membership of the bodies would also be a point 
that would need further elaboration and negotiation among states and other 
relevant actors.  
 
The principles established in the Convention are useful and there could be value in 
New Zealand and other countries involving them in policymaking as guides for 
agreements between states on climate change-related migration.  One principle is 
glaringly absent from the Convention, as there is no requirement for hosts to accept 
migrants (Ibid, p. 15).  In theory this is not problematic, but Hodgkinson et al do not 
clarify where the imperative to accept migrants would come from, unless we are to 
assume that it is a sense of guilt stemming from historical responsibility.  However as 
Burson points out, there is a fundamental problem with rights protection of climate 
change-related migrants if they have no guaranteed right to reside in the host 
country, regardless of theoretical principles around a state’s responsibility for part of 
the cause of their move.   
 
Elevating the plight of small island states as those most likely to be deeply affected 
soon is a welcome development for a group of states that have limited political and 
fiscal capacity for drawing the attention of the international community to their 
plight, or for dealing with the problem themselves.  However, the proposed 
Convention does not mention taking account of the difficulties faced by some small 
island states, which do not have the human or technical capacity to deal with 
managing such a problem at the ground level or the accountability requirements 
attached to funding.  These such requirements are inevitable, as donors are 
ultimately responsible to their taxpayers. In some cases small island states in the 
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Pacific request assistance from donors and/or regional organisations for managing 
funding disbursement and accountability, and such relationships do not seem to 
have been considered by the authors of the proposed Convention.  While this may 
seem to be one of the smaller aspects of the proposal, given that the authors are all 
based in Australia it is surprising that they have not more closely examined the 
practical situation of small island states in their region.   
In sum, the proposed Convention draws up some issues that need consideration by 
all states, around the potential for climate change-related migration and the 
associated costs.  However, Hodgkinson, Burton, Anderson and Young’s proposed 
Convention is not currently framed in a way that would be acceptable to those who 
will be asked to fund it, probably not to those who would probably be on the 
receiving end.  Practically, it takes steps towards a management structure that 
involves checks and balances on the scientific and fiscal aspects of climate change-
related migration, but would do well to look at utilising existing systems and 
information rather than duplicating an unattractive trait to potential donors.    
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Conclusion 
 
It is likely that the effects of climate change will have an impact on the lives and 
livelihoods of some people, that in conjunction with other factors influencing their 
decisions, they decide that it is necessary to migrate to enjoy a satisfactory life.  This 
migration could be internal, within their state boundaries, or external, to another 
country.  Regardless of the direction and reasons for movement, it is clear that 
existing approaches to the problem of climate change-related migration are 
insufficient for managing it to an extent that ensures peoples rights are protected.   
 
The international community has a vested interest in ensuring sound intervention 
logic an approach with such broad application such as this.  As yet, the international 
community has not developed a coordinated approach to the potential problem of 
climate change-related migration and related issues, despite the proliferation of 
discussions and frameworks that is being thought up.  There are various factors 
preventing or at least delaying this coordination, not least that it remains unclear 
whether there is a convincing argument for needing a specific framework to manage 
this type of migration.  
 
Existing patterns of migration and decision-making, and the spectrum of actions 
from adaptation to migration are key factors that have been to a certain extent 
swept aside by the authors’ clearer, simpler picture of climate change-related 
migration.  However, these factors are vitally important during the process of 
considering an international approach so as to not exacerbate the very problem that 
is being addressed.  If existing migration and adaptation strategies are not 
considered as part of the approach to addressing potential climate change-related 
migration, more people could be forced from their homes because of the unchecked 
effects of climate change and the inability to adapt to the changing world.  
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It is obvious that the potential problem of climate change-related migration is 
significant, but it is not clear that creating this proposed approach to it would not 
disadvantage other types of migrants in the process.  Consideration of an approach 
(including its necessity) is in part constrained by the complexity of the issues at hand.  
Migration is not new, unique, or particularly special in the context of the human 
condition, nor is climate change-related migration identifiably unique from other 
types of migration so as to justify its separate treatment and potential resulting 
inequities.  
 
This last consideration may seem callous but is in fact crucial if those attempting to 
smooth the path of climate change-related migrants do not wish to disadvantage 
economic migrants or refugees.  Similarly, it is crucial if we do not wish to subjugate 
existing development challenges to this issue that has gained significant prominence 
in recent years in ways that nonetheless necessarily furthered its cause.  
 
Despite the significant research, attention, and policies that have been developed on 
the potential for climate change-related migration, there is nothing drawing the 
approaches together and they do not appear to be necessarily aware of or utilising 
each other’s developments. This suggests that there is a need to find a way to fill the 
gaps between existing work based on non-climate change-related migration 
situations, and the work underway at different levels.  However, all of these 
assumptions, as well as the approaches already developed, have assumed that there 
needs to be an approach to dealing with climate change-related migration, that 
existing mechanisms are inadequate.    
 
 
The proposed Convention created by Hodgkinson, Anderson, Burton and Young 
creates a practical framework for the management of potential climate change-
related migrants and establishes mechanisms for providing financial support and 
migration assistance through a centralized body.  It has made practical and 
theoretical contributions to the work on addressing gaps in human rights protection 
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mechanisms and functional management of this potential type of movement of 
people, which is not catered for under many existing mechanisms.   
 
 
 
However, the contribution of the proposed Convention is not so significant as to 
solve the potential problem, not least as it appears to be unaware of some existing 
approaches that have made significant contributions in their areas.  For the 
international community as a whole, further work is needed to address the political 
issue of the nexus between identifying a need and justification of a response, and on 
the practical issues surrounding the potential problem of climate change-related 
migration.   
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